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ESSAY
ON THE DIVERGENT AMERICAN REACTIONS TO
TERRORISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Cass R. Sunstein*
Two of the most important sources of catastrophicrisk are terrorism and
climate change. The United States has responded aggressively to the risk of
terrorism while doing very little about the risk of climate change. For the
United States alone, the cost of the Iraq War is in excess of the anticipated
cost of the Kyoto Protocol. The divergence presents a puzzle; it also raises
more general questions about both risk perception and the public demandfor
legislation. The best explanationfor the divergence emphasizes bounded rationality. Americans believe that aggressive steps to reduce the risk of terrorism promise to deliver significant benefits in the near future at acceptable
cost. By contrast, they believe that aggressive steps to reduce the risk of climate change will not greatly benefit American citizens in the nearfutureand they are not willing to pay a great deal to reduce that risk. This intuitive form of cost-benefit analysis is greatly influenced by behavioralfactors,
includingthe availability heuristic,probability neglect, outrage, and myopia.
All of these contribute, after 9/11, to a willingness to support significant
steps to respond to terrorism and to relative indifference to climate change. It
follows that Americans are likely to support significant steps in response to
climate change only f one of two conditions is met: the costs of those steps
are perceived to be acceptably low; or new information, perhaps including a
salient incident, indicates that Americans have much to gain from risk reduction in the relatively nearfuture.
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"We have to deal with this new type of threat in a way we haven't
yet defined .... With a low-probability, high-impact event like
this... [i]f there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists
are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we
have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response."
-Vice President Dick Cheney1
"[C] limate change is the most severe problem that we are facing
today-more serious even than the threat of terrorism."
2
-Sir David King
"I see little evidence, at least in the United States, that people
want to make significant additional sacrifices to raise living standards among the people who live now in the developing world.
It would surprise me if they could get excited about raising liv1. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine 61-62 (2006).
2. David A. King, Climate Change Science: Adapt, Mitigate, or Ignore, 303 Science
176, 176 (2004).
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ing standards in those same parts of the world at a time in the
future.
3
-Thomas Schelling
"The greater the apparent threat from visible forms of pollution
and the more vividly this can be dramatized, the more public
support environmental improvement will receive and the longer
it will sustain public interest. Ironically, the cause of ecologists
would therefore benefit from an environmental disaster like a
'killer smog' that would choke thousands to death in a few
days."
4
-Anthony Downs
INTRODUCTION

It is an understatement to say that in the last decade, a great deal of
attention has been paid to terrorism and climate change. What unifies
the two sets of risks is their potentially catastrophic quality.5 The attacks
of 9/11 killed about three thousand people, an unquestionably large
number; but other forms of terrorism, perhaps involving biological or
nuclear weapons, could kill many more, conceivably a million people or
more. 6 Some of the worst-case scenarios associated with climate change
involve many millions of deaths as a direct and indirect result of warmer
temperatures. 7 Human beings face a number of catastrophic risks, but
terrorism and climate change rank among the most serious.
The two risks share an additional feature. It is not easy to assign
probabilities to the worst-case outcomes. Officials cannot reasonably say
that the risk of a catastrophic terrorist attack, in the next ten years, is
3. Thomas C. Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, in Discounting and
Intergenerational Equity 99, 101 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting].
4. Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology-The "Issue Attention Cycle," 28 Pub.
Int. 38, 46-47 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin, What's Wrong with Terrorism? 119 (2006) (noting risk
of a million deaths from efficient biological attack); Mark Maslin, Global Warming 83-101
(2004) (summarizing possible future impacts of global warming); William D. Nordhaus &
Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming 69-98 (2003)
(estimating impacts of climate change); Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe 43-58, 75-86
(2005) (detailing risks of potential catastrophes including global warming and bioterror);
Martin Rees, Our Final Hour 186 (2003) ("Our increasingly interconnected world is
vulnerable to new risks; 'bio' or 'cyber,' terror or error.").
6. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 119; Posner, supra note 5, at 75-86. For a skeptical
view, see John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate
National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them 13-28 (2006) (arguing that
catastrophic risks associated with terrorism are quite low).
7. See Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 78-83; Posner, supra note 5, at 43-58. An
especially comprehensive treatment can be found in Nicholas Stern, Stern Review: The
Economics of Climate Change 56 (2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
independent-reviews/sternreview economicsclimate_change/sternreviewindex.cfm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting, for example, that one to three million
more people will die from malnutrition at 30 C warming).
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somewhere between (say) 5% and 30%. According to the One Percent
Doctrine sketched by Vice President Cheney, a small chance of a disastrous harm deserves serious attention; 8 the problem is rendered still
more difficult by the fact that we may not know if the risk is 1%, or 5%, or
10%, or 20%. The same might well be true of climate change. On one,
now-dated estimate, the risk of catastrophe, by the year 2100, is somewhere between 2% and 6%.' But some people believe that we lack sufficient information to assign a probability to that risk; there are simply too
many imponderables.' 0 In the domains of terrorism and climate change,
nations might be thought to be operating in the domain of uncertainty
rather than risk, in the sense that they are able to identify the worst outcomes without being able to specify the likelihood that they will occur."
Both terrorism and climate change, then, are potentially catastrophic
risks where probabilities cannot easily be specified; they are also risks that
are likely, if they do come to fruition, to affect many people at the same
time.
My principal concern in this Essay is the stark difference between
American reactions to terrorism-related risks and American reactions to
the risks associated with climate change. 12 An explanation of this difference should cast light on the demand for risk-related law in general; it
8. Suskind, supra note 1, at 61-62.
9. See Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 88, 90 (suggesting 1.2% probability of
catastrophic impact with 2.50 C warming and 6.8% probability with 60 C warming). This
estimate was obtained by starting with a survey of relevant experts, using the median
answer, and adjusting that answer upwards in accordance with more recent information.
See id. at 87-88. Under the circumstances, with so much uncertainty and rapidly changing
data, there is no reason for confidence in the resulting figures. For reason to believe that
the risk of catastrophic warming is serious, see Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change 7-23
(HansJoachim Schellnhuber et al. eds., 2006). For a much more systematic effort to assess
probabilities of bad outcomes, see Stern, supra note 7, at 152-65, 195.
10. See John Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing 178 (3d ed. 2004)
(noting that "[t] he potential impact of climate change on human health could be large,"
but that "the factors involved are highly complex; any quantitative conclusions will require
careful study"); Maslin, supra note 5, at 97 (noting projection of potential increase in
malaria exposure, by 2080s, of 260-320 million people); Posner, supra note 5, at 49
(noting scientific uncertainties with respect to magnitude and effects of climate change);
Stern, supra note 7, at 152-62 (assessing probabilities and incorporating them into general
account of costs of climate change).
11. For a lucid treatment, see Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change 185-207
(1983) (discussing meaning of uncertainty and possible responses to it in context of energy
choice and nuclear power). I am bracketing many complexities here. It is possible that
the uncertainty is bounded, in the sense that experts can say, with some confidence, that
the risk of catastrophic climate change is over 1% but below 40%; perhaps the same is true
for terrorism. For present purposes, it is not necessary to explore these questions.
12. Other risks share some of the characteristics of terrorism and global warming.
See generally Posner, supra note 5 (analyzing catastrophic risks associated with asteroid
impacts, scientific accidents, bioweaponry, global warming, loss of biodiversity, and nuclear
winter); Rees, supra note 5 (discussing natural and technological threats to Earth
including, inter alia, asteroid impacts, "supereruptions," greenhouse warming, terrorism,
and scientific experiments gone awry). It would undoubtedly be illuminating to investigate
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should also provide a useful test of competing accounts of how human
beings think about social hazards. With respect to terrorism, the attacks
of 9/11 are highly salient, in a way that is likely to lead people to perceive
a strong likelihood of a future attack or perhaps to neglect the question
of probability altogether, focusing instead on the worst that might happen. The public reaction is amplified by outrage, accompanied by the
existence of an identifiable perpetrator in the form of Osama bin Laden
and his allies. 13 For these reasons, visceral reactions are likely to be intense. National officials, sometimes acting as worst-case entrepreneurs,
have focused attention on the risk of terrorism, thus amplifying the effects of the salient incident and public outrage.
With respect to climate change, the situation is entirely different. No
salient event heightens public concern, and indeed most people lack personal experience that would make the relevant risks seem immediate or
even real as opposed to speculative and hypothetical.' 4 Climate change
generally does not trigger strong emotions, and people are willing to consider whether significant harm is probable. The sources of climate
change are obscure and multiple, and they lack faces; hence outrage, an
amplifier with respect to public reactions to risk, is dampened or absent.
To the extent that people understand that they are themselves contributors to climate change, they are inclined to diminish the magnitude of
the threat. Americans believe that the most serious risks associated with
climate change will occur in the long term and will be faced mostly by
people in other nations. For these reasons, there is little in the way of
visceral concern. It is possible that national leaders could nonetheless
focus attention on the risk of climate change. But for the most part, they
have not yet done so.
My goals here are positive, not normative. I do not mean to suggest
any particular approach to the problems of terrorism and climate
change, or to endorse any view about how to rank or compare the two
problems. Those who believe that climate change is self-evidently the
more serious problem might be tempted to explain the divergent reactions by reference to the power of well-organized interests in the United
States, or some combination of selfishness, ignorance, and obtuseness on
the part of those responsible for American law and policy. Those who
believe that terrorism is self-evidently the more serious problem, and that
climate change poses highly speculative risks for which it is appropriate to
American reactions to those risks as well. But the divergence explored here is especially
striking, and a great deal of information is available with which to untangle the puzzle.
13. See Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, The Devil You Know: The Effects
of Identifiability on Punishment, 18 J. Behav. Decision Making 311, 315-16 (2005)
(describing special hostility to, and desire to punish, identifiable perpetrators).
14. See Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of LongTerm Risk: Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 Climatic Change 103,
108-14 (2006) (exploring different pathways to fear of social hazards).
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"wait and learn,"' 5 may find no puzzle at all. But whatever one's view
about the normative issues, the question of risk perception should have
independent interest. As we shall see, it would be most surprising ifjudgments about risks of this kind were unerring or if they closely tracked
expert opinion. The demand for risk regulation raises important puzzles
of its own; 1 6 and the supply is affected by the demand.
Although I do not explore the normative issues, there is a clear prescriptive implication: The United States is unlikely to take significant
steps to reduce greenhouse gases unless the perceived costs of risk reduction are decreased, an available incident triggers fear of significant and
relatively imminent harm, sustained analysis or influential leaders suggest
that Americans face serious risks, or all three. With respect to depletion
of the ozone layer, the United States played a pivotal role in spurring an
effective worldwide response, partly because the costs of that response
were perceived as low, partly because an available finding heightened
public concern, and partly because sustained analysis suggested that the
underlying risks were extremely serious. 1 7 Altruistic or self-interested actors, in the private or public spheres, might well be able to enlist these
points in any effort to increase the likelihood that the public will
respond.
The remainder of this Essay comes in four parts. Part I briefly outlines American beliefs and practices. Part II explores the psychometric
paradigm and affect, in an effort to see whether these accounts of risk
perception explain the divergent American reactions. We shall see that
while they provide some important clues, the divergence remains inadequately explained. Part III investigates the relationships among costs,
benefits, and attitudes toward climate change and terrorism. The conclusion is that costs and benefits play a significant role, but that perceived
costs and perceived benefits are more important, and that the perceptions cannot be explained without reference to behavioral factors. Finally, Part 1V explores bounded rationality, with special attention to the
role of the availability heuristic, probability neglect, outrage, and myopia.
Attention is also devoted to cultural accounts of risk perception and to

15. See Robert Mendelsohn, Perspective Paper 1.1, in Global Crises, Global Solutions
44, 47 (Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2004) (arguing for little or no immediate action to control
climate change). This position is challenged in many places, see, e.g., Houghton, supra
note 10, at 227-30 (contending that immediate controls on greenhouse gases are
justified); Stern, supra note 7, at vi-ix (describing economic consensus in favor of some
kind of effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
16. See George Loewenstein &Jane Mather, Dynamic Processes in Risk Perception, 3
J. Risk & Uncertainty 155, 161-65 (1990) (discussing relationship between risk perceptions
and social realities).
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 15-16, on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto] (showing role of cost-benefit
analysis in producing proregulatory posture of the United States).
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possible developments that would make Americans more supportive of
efforts to regulate greenhouse gases.
I. BELIEFS AND PRACTICES

With respect to climate change and terrorism, American beliefs and
practices are complex and variable. Of course there is a degree of heterogeneity. The basic story, however, is relatively straightforward, and it
reveals a sharp asymmetry in reactions to the two sets of risks.
A. Climate Change
1. Actions. - In terms of legal mandates, the U.S. government has
done close to nothing to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, relying largely on collecting information about emissions levels and encouraging further research. t 8 One of the nation's principal goals is an 18%
improvement in greenhouse gas intensity between 2002 and 2012, with
intensity measured as emissions per unit of gross domestic product
(GDP). 19 But this goal is an aspiration, not a requirement, 20 and in any
18. For overviews, see Daniel R. Abbasi, Americans and Climate Change: Closing the
Gap Between Science and Action 20-23 (2006); Press Release, White House, Office of the
Press Sec'y, Climate Change Fact Sheet (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/
rls/fs/46741.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Climate Change Fact
Sheet]; Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses
Global Climate Change (June 11, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Climate Change, at http://epa.gov/climatechange/index.html
(last
modified Oct. 23, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), and in particular the
reports mentioned at U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Global Warming-Actions, at http://
yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/actions.html
(last modified Jan. 7,
2000) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). On June 22, 2005, a 53-44 majority of the
United States Senate approved a "sense of the Senate" resolution to the effect that
"Congress should enact a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory
market-based limits and incentives on greenhouse gases that slow, stop and reverse the
growth of such emissions." Abbasi, supra, at 20. The most aggressive legislative proposal,
from Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman in 2003, would have capped
greenhouse gas emissions at 2000 levels. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 55-43.
For an overview, see Press Release, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Senr.te
Casts Historic Vote on McCain-Lieberman Global Warming Bill (Oct. 30, 2003), available
at http://commerce.senate.gov/newsroom/printable.cfm?id=214305
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review). For an analysis, see generally Sergey Paltsev et al., Emissions
Trading to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the United States: The McCainLieberman Proposal (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Joint Program on Sci. & Pol'y Global Change,
Report No. 97, 2003), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGCRpt97.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
19. For a helpful outline, see Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Analysis of
President Bush's Climate Change Plan, at http://www.pewclimate.org/policy-center/
analyses/response bushpolicy.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2006) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
20. See id.
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case, significant reductions in greenhouse gas intensity can be accompa21
nied by extremely large increases in greenhouse gas emissions.
To be sure, substantial resources are being devoted to research.2 2 In
2005, over $5 billion was appropriated for climate change programs and
energy tax incentives; a 4.8% increase was planned for 2006.23 Nearly $2
billion has been appropriated specifically for the Climate Change Science
Program, a multi-agency program designed to analyze existing trends and
to explore possible solutions. 24 Since 1992, the Department of Energy
has been required to estimate aggregate greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States, and annual reports are available. 2 5 These estimates are
mandated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 26 signed by the United States; 27 it is noteworthy that the Framework Convention includes no emissions reduction mandates, in large
28
part because the United States resisted them.
One of the more ambitious current programs involves company-bycompany reporting of actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
but this program itself remains voluntary, 29 in sharp contrast to the reporting requirements in other federal statutes. 30 Hence the United
21. This in fact has been the experience of the United States between 1990 and 2004,
with significant reductions in greenhouse gas intensity (by 21%) accompanied by
significant growth in carbon dioxide emissions (by 19%). Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't
of Energy, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2004, at xii (2005),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/057304.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
22. See U.S. Global Change Research Program, at http://www.usgcrp.gov (last visited
Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing government-supported
research regarding climate change).
23. See Climate Change Fact Sheet, supra note 18 (describing increase in funding
over 2005 level).
24. Id.
25. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 21, at iii; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, US Emissions
Inventory 2006, at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarning.nsf/content/resource
centerpublicationsghgemissionsusemissionsinventory2006.html
(last modified Oct. 9,
2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
26. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165.
27. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol Status
of Ratification 7 (2006), available at http://unfccc.int/files/essentialbackground/
convention/statusof.ratification/application/pdf/unfccc ratification_22.11.06.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
28. Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft 368-69 (2003).
29. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Under Section
1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992: General Guidelines (1994), available at http://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/1605b.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For an
example of a voluntary report from General Motors Corporation, see Gen. Motors Corp.,
Voluntary Reporting of General Motors Corporation United States Greenhouse Gas
(GHG) Emissions for Calendar Years 1990-2002 (2003), at http://www.gm.com/
company/gmability/environment/newsissues/news/ghgreport2003.pdf
(on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k (2000) (requiring monitoring and computing of aggregate
annual total carbon dioxide emissions to be made available to public); id. § 13385(a)
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States lacks a company-by-company Greenhouse Gas Inventory, comparable to the Toxic Release Inventory that has played such a large role in
reducing toxic emissions. 3' At the international level, the most aggressive
program in which the United States now participates is the "methane to
markets" agreement, 32 but this agreement provides only a modest contribution to greenhouse gas abatement. 3 3 No regulatory limits are imposed
on greenhouse gases from fossil fuels, motor vehicles, or any other
source, notwithstanding efforts to require the national government to im34
pose such limits.
To be sure, state and local governments have undertaken some action on their own. In December 2005, the governors of seven states
signed a Memorandum of Understanding designed to create a regional
"cap-and-trade" plan to reduce power plant emissions. 35 The mayors of
over 350 cities, representing over 55 million Americans, have pledged to
meet city-level goals corresponding with the requirements of the Kyoto
Protocol. 36 In June 2005, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger pledged to
reduce California's greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, 3 7 a
pledge that helped lead to the West Coast Governors' Global Warming
38
Initiative, which includes California, Washington, and Oregon.
(requiring inventory of national aggregate emissions of each greenhouse gas for each
calendar year for baseline period of 1987 through 1990, updated annually).
31. See James T. Hamilton, Regulation Through Revelation: The Origin, Politics, and
Impacts of the Toxic Release Inventory Program 208-43 (2005) (offering detailed account
of effect of Toxic Release Inventory).
32. See Methane to Mkts., Member Profile of the United States, at http://
www.methanetomarkets.org/partners/country/usa.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); U.S. Envd. Prot. Agency, Methane to Markets Partnership,
at http://www.epa.gov/methanetomarkets/basicinfo.htm (last updated Oct. 12, 2006) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
33. See Energy Info. Admin., supra note 21, at tbl.ES2 (showing that methane is
relatively small component of aggregate American contributions to climate change).
34. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (raising question of
possible statutory obligation of EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicles),
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006).
35. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: An Initiative of the Northeast & MidAtlantic States of the U.S., at http://www.rggi.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
36. See Office of the Mayor, U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, at http://
www.seatde.gov/mayor/climate/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) ("As of January 10, 2007 358 mayors representing over 55 million Americans have
accepted the challenge."). For information on the Kyoto Protocol in general, see United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, at http://unfccc.int/2860.php (last
visited Oct. 16, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing official United
Nations updates on climate change issues); Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 145-66
(discussing effects of Kyoto Protocol on climate change and on economic variables).
37. Miguel Bustillo, Gov. Vows Attack on Global Warming, L.A. Times, June 2, 2005,
at B1.
38. See Press Release, West Coast Governors' Global Warming Initiative 1-3 (Nov. 18,
2005), available at http://www.ef.org/westcoastclimate/WCClimate.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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California has enacted legislation to reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases from automobiles, with a 22% reduction target by 2012 and a 30%
reduction target by 2016.39 In 2006, California took the most ambitious
step to date by enacting legislation that would require statewide emissions
to be capped at 1990 levels by 2020-a step that would require a 25% cut
from the levels that would be expected without regulation. 40 These various initiatives go well beyond the actions of the national government, but
even as a whole, they are projected to produce only modest emissions
reductions in the United States.
2. Public Opinion. - The behavior of the national government is not
inconsistent with the views of the American public, though those views
are admittedly unstable and complex. 4' On the one hand, a large majority of Americans (88%) were found as early as 2000 to favor the Kyoto
Protocol.4 2 About 90% believed that the United States should reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions; 79% supported an increase in fuel economy
standards; and 77% favored government regulation of carbon dioxide as
a pollutant. 43 In the same year, a slim majority (54%) also supported a
tax on "gas guzzlers. ''44 In 2006, 61% supported restrictions on power
45
plants designed to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
On the other hand, strong majorities were opposed to a gasoline tax
(68%)46 and to a business energy tax (60%) designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 4 7 In 2000, the environment ranked only sixteenth
among the most important problems in the nation, and indeed climate
change was ranked twelfth of thirteen environmental issues (below urban
sprawl).48 Notwithstanding the vast publicity given to climate change in
39. Abbasi, supra note 18, at 21.
40. See Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark Legislation to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/
press-release/4111/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
41. See Anthony Leiserowitz, Communicating the Risks of Global Warming:
American Risk Perceptions, Affective Images and Interpretive Communities, in
Communication and Social Change: Strategies for Dealing with the Climate Crisis (S.
Moser & L. Dilling eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 5-12, on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Leiserowitz, Communicating] (exploring role of affect in American
risk perceptions); Anthony Leiserowitz, Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy
Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values, 77 Climatic Change 45, 46 (2006)
[hereinafter Leiserowitz, Climate] (same).
42. Leiserowitz, Communicating, supra note 41 (manuscript at 3). The United States
has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. See Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental
Regulation 1070-71 (4th ed. 2003). For a list of the 163 nations that have ratified the
protocol, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol
Status of Ratification, supra note 27.
43. Leiserowitz, Climate, supra note 41, at 55.
44. Id.
45. ABC News/Time/Stanford Univ. Poll, Mar. 9-14, 2006, at http://www.polling
report.com/enviro.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
46. Id.
47. Leiserowitz, Climate, supra note 41, at 11.
48. Leiserowitz, Communicating, supra note 41 (manuscript at 4).
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recent years, polls showed broadly similar conclusions in 2006, with
Americans ranking the environment twelfth on a list of the most important problems, below immigration, health care, and gas and heating oil
prices. Among environmental problems, climate change was ranked
ninth, well below damage to the ozone layer (a problem that has long
been handled through regulatory controls). 49 Another 2006 poll found
that a large majority of Americans oppose an increase in taxes on electricity and gasoline as an attempt to reduce climate change. 50 In the same
year, a different poll did find that 59% of Americans would support an
increase in the gasoline tax to reduce the threat of climate change, but
51
the magnitude of the increase was not specified.
It seems clear that while Americans show some and perhaps increasing interest in the problem of climate change, they are not willing to
sacrifice a great deal to reduce the associated risks. As we shall see in
more detail below, most Americans do not believe that climate change
poses a serious threat in the near future, and hence they do not think
that they, or their friends and family members, face a real risk in the
short term. 52 Notably, citizens of many nations show more concern about
climate change than Americans do; in 2003, higher levels of concern
were found in Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Ireland, Great Britain,
Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Chile, and Poland. 53 In 2001, citizens in Europe in general, and Britain in particular,
ranked harms to the environment as the largest global threat, above poverty, natural disasters, famine, AIDS/HIV, and even war. 54 Indeed, a majority of Britons (63%), polled in 2004, ranked climate change as the
most important environmental issue in the world. 55 In the same year,
terrorism was ranked as the "most serious threat to the future wellbeing
of the world" by 48% of those polled, but global warming came in second, at 25%, about double the number for population growth and AIDS/
HIV. 56 It is an understatement to say that the issue of climate change has
far less salience in the United States. In 2006, Americans were found to
have a lower level of concern about climate change than citizens of the
fourteen other nations involved; significantly higher rates of concern
49. See Andrew C. Revkin, Yelling "Fire" on a Hot Planet, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2006,
§ 4, at 1 (summarizing Gallup survey of American concerns).
50. ABC News/Time/Stanford Univ. Poll, supra note 45.
51. See N.Y. Times/CBS News Poll 2, Feb. 22-26, 2006, at http://environment.about.
com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi=l/XJ&sdn=environment&zu=http%3A%2F%2fwww.ny
times.com%2Fpackages%2Fpdf%2Fnational%2F20060228_poll-results.pdf
(on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
52. See infra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
53. See Steven R. Brechin, Comparative Public Opinion and Knowledge on Global
Climatic Change and the Kyoto Protocol: The U.S. Versus the World?, 23 Int'l J. Soc. &
Soc. Pol'y 106, 110 (2003).
54. See Andrew Norton & John Leaman, The Day After Tomorrow: Public Opinion
on Climate Change 4 (2004) (showing different nations' attitudes toward climate change).
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 6.
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were shown in Russia, Spain, Nigeria, Japan, India, France, Pakistan, and
57
Turkey, among others.
To be sure, Americans are relatively supportive of programs that, as
they perceive it, do not impose costs on the public but instead on some
such abstraction as "companies" or "power plants. ' 58 But when the costs
are direct, and are seen as requiring out-of-pocket expenditures, their
enthusiasm for legal controls on greenhouse gases diminishes
dramatically.
3. Emissions. - What are the consequences of legal practices and
social beliefs for greenhouse gas emissions? Perhaps unsurprisingly, such
emissions have been increasing in the United States in the very period in
which climate change has received attention both domestically and
abroad. Greenhouse gas emissions increased by no less than 15.8% between 1990 and 2004.-9 In 1990, carbon dioxide emissions were 5,002.3
million metric tons; in 2004, they were 5,973.0 million metric tons, a
jump of 19%.60 To be sure, greenhouse gas intensity has indeed been
decreasing in the same period, with a significant decline of 21%.61 But
because of increased energy usage, per capita emissions have actually increased over this period by 1.2%-an increase that, alongside population
62
growth, produced the increase in aggregate emissions.
Fossil fuel combustion is by far the largest contributor to greenhouse
gas emissions in the United States, accounting for 98% of carbon dioxide
emissions. 63 While methane emissions were reduced by 10% from 1990
to 2004, greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels have been growing in
most sectors, with total emissions increasing by 1.7% in 2004 aloneamong the largest increases on record from any nation. 64 All the principal sectors-which include residential, commercial, industrial, and
transportation-related uses-remain free from national regulation. By
contrast, substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, between
1990 and 2003, can be found in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Iceland, Luxem65
bourg, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany.
57. Stern, supra note 7, at 465.
58. ABC News/Time/Stanford Univ. Poll, supra note 45.
59. See Energy Info. Admin., supra note 21, at ix; Larry West, Record Increase in U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Sparks Global Controversy, Apr. 19, 2006, at http://
environment.about.com/b/a/256722.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
60. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 21, at x, xii.
61. Id. at xii.
62. Id.
63. Id. at x-xii.
64. Id. at xii.
65. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Key GHG Data
16-17 (2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/keyghg.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). These figures must, however, be taken with many
grains of salt. Notably, several countries show emissions increases comparable to or higher
than those of the United States. These include Canada (24.2%), New Zealand (22.5%),
Australia (23.3%), Austria (16.5%), Greece (25.8%), Ireland (25.6%), Portugal (36.7%),
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B. Terrorism
With terrorism, the picture is very different. After the 9/11 attacks,
the risk of terrorism has been consistently ranked among the most pressing problems facing the United States. 66 It is an understatement to say
that the American government has taken massive steps to reduce terrorism-related risks. The most expensive are almost certainly the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, undertaken in large part to reduce those risks.
The war in Iraq has been extremely costly. As of September 2005, $212
billion had been allocated from the U.S. Treasury, and aggregate costs
were estimated at $255 billion to the United States, $40 billion to coalition partners, and $134 billion to Iraq, for a total global cost of $428
billion. 67 As of September 2006, the appropriations were $318.5 billion 6 8-ensuring that the cost of the Iraq War, to the United States, has
now surpassed the total expected cost of the Kyoto Protocol, which on
plausible assumptions would have been $325 billion. 69 There is a great
deal more in the way of costly activity related to the war on terror, including new legislation 70 and numerous regulations. 71
With respect to particular measures to combat terrorism, Americans
disagree on a great deal. But they agree that the risk of terrorism is both
serious and real, and they favor expensive precautions to reduce that risk.
Spain (41.7%), and Italy (11.5%). Collapses in the Eastern European economies led to
significant decreases in greenhouse gas emissions, and most of Western Europe is not close
to meeting its targets under the Kyoto Protocol. On the relevant facts, and on domestic
self-interest and greenhouse gas reductions, see Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra
note 17 (manuscript at 31-34).
66. In 2006, for example, 45% of Americans said that they worried "a great deal"
about the possibility of future terrorist attacks, the same percentage that worried about
"crime and violence," and a higher percentage than worried about the economy, hunger
and homelessness, and the environment. Gallup Poll, Mar. 13-16, 2006, at http://
www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
67. See Scott Wallsten & Katrina Kosec, The Iraq War: The Economic Costs, Milken
Inst. Rev., Sept. 2006, at 16, 18.
68. Nat. Priorities Project, Cost of Iraq War Rises Higher for American Taxpayers 1
n.1, Sept. 2006, at http://nationalpriorities.org/auxiliary/maps files/iraqseptO6/US.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
69. See Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 161. This cost estimate might turn out to
be inflated if replacements for carbon dioxide have a diminishing cost as a result of
technological innovation. Id.
70. For an overview, see Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2002/
pdcongress.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
most prominent enactments include the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18, 22, 28, 42, 49, & 50
U.S.C.), the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), and the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (codified as
amendment at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. III 2005)).
71. For an early catalogue, see Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Draft Report to Congress
on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,013, 15,015-15,018
(Mar. 28, 2002).
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In 2006, the Pew Research Center found that defending the nation from
terrorism was a "top priority" for 80% of Americans-a higher percentage than for any other problem. 72 In the period shortly after the 9/11
attacks, 88% of Americans believed that it was either very likely or somewhat likely that there would be "another terrorist attack ... within the
next few months"-with about half of Americans worrying about the possibility that a family member might "become a victim of a terrorist attack,"
and over 40% worrying that "terrorist attacks might take place where
73
[they] live or work."
Later studies have continued to show a high level of concern, with
many people believing that an imminent attack is likely.74 In July 2005,
nearly half of respondents described themselves as "somewhat" or "very"
worried that they, or someone in their family, would be a victim of terrorism.75 More than half also said that it was somewhat or very likely that
there would be a terrorist attack in the United States "over the next several weeks."' 76 In 2006, there was actually an increase, from the year
before, in the percentage of Americans saying that they were "very worried or somewhat worried" that they or someone in their family would
"become a victim of terrorism." 77 There can be little doubt that the level
of concern is lower now than it was in the immediate aftermath of the
9/11 attacks, and that public fear will leap after any future attack. But
whatever emerges from any particular slice in time, it is clear that Americans believe that they face a serious threat of a terrorist attack in the notdistant future and that they and their loved ones are at risk. Americans
are willing to support substantial measures to reduce the threat.
C. Beliefs and Regulation
The divergent public judgments about climate change and terrorism
help to account for governmental behavior. Of course there are many
possible relationships between public attitudes and government responses. For a general orientation, consider the following table:
72. Pew Research Center Survey, Jan. 4-8, 2006, at http://www.pollingreport.com/
prioriti.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
73. See Program on International Policy Attitudes, Americans and the World, at
http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/terrorism/
terrorism-perception.cfm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
74. A 2002 study, involving students at Harvard University, found a "best estimate"
mean of 294 deaths from terrorism in the next year, with an "upper bound" best estimate
of 25,691. See W. Kip Viscusi & RichardJ. Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce
Terrorism Risks, 26 J. Risk & Uncertainty 99, 108-11 (2003). Interestingly, the median
upper bound estimates of "total fatalities due to all terrorism" were lower than the median
upper bound estimates of "total fatalities due to airplane terrorism"-a finding to which I
will return. Id.
75. USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll, July 22-24, 2005, at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/polls/2005-07-25-july-poll.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
76. Id.
77. See Mueller, supra note 6, at 2.
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TERRORISM AN
TABLE

1:

CLIMATE CHANGE

THE DEMAND FOR RISK REDUCTION
Officials want risk reduction

Officials do not want risk
reduction

Public demands risk
reduction

War on terror after 9/11

Superfund legislation
(governing abandoned
hazardous waste dumps);
restrictions on the pesticide
Alar

Public does not demand risk
reduction

Controls on ozone-depleting
chemicals; acid deposition

Controls on greenhouse
gases; airline security before

regulation

9/11

We can easily imagine cases in which both the public and its representatives favor risk reduction, especially if the focus is on worst-case scenarios. After the attacks of 9/11, this was certainly the case with respect
to the war on terror. The same can plausibly be said about certain steps
to reduce air pollution. 78 In other contexts, the public does not demand
risk reduction, but officials favor it; they are permitted to take certain
steps because the public as a whole does not oppose them, and electoral
retribution is unlikely. This was the case with respect to controls on acid
deposition. 79 With respect to controls on ozone-depleting chemicals, the
public did not exactly demand regulation, but there was considerable
public interest in it, and officials acted in a way that conformed to public
80
concern.
Very different issues arise when the public demands some kind of
regulatory response even though officials would not favor it on their own.
This was plausibly the case with respect to the Superfund statute, designed to regulate abandoned hazardous waste sites. The publicity given
to the supposed disaster at Love Canal made a statutory response almost
inevitable, even if many officials did not favor it either publicly or privately.8 1 The same category probably includes the public demand for
78. See Hamilton, supra note 31, at 177-91 (exploring role of public opinion cycles in
spurring enactment and enforcement of legislation involving toxic release reporting); E.
Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, I J.L. Econ. & Org. 313, 327-28
(1985) (exploring electoral competition, between President Nixon and Senator Muskie, to
claim credit for aggressive air pollution regulation).
79. See Kevin Esterling, The Political Economy of Expertise 114-60 (2004) (showing
how expertise, in particular on question of emissions trading, contributed to enactment of
acid deposition provisions of Clean Air Act). For a parallel story with respect to ozonedepleting chemicals, see generally Richard Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (1991). The
evidence here is more complicated because a substantial segment of the public supported
controls on such chemicals. Id.
80. See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 17 (manuscript at 8-9)
(exploring public concern about ozone depletion in United States and Europe and
corresponding importance officials placed on ozone issues).
81. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation,
51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 691-98 (1998) (contending that public concern about abandoned
hazardous waste dumps far outstrips scientific evidence of their harm); Matthew E. Kahn,
Environmental Disasters as Regulation Catalysts? The Role of Bhopal, Chernobyl, Exxon-
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some kind of response to the health hazards allegedly associated with the
pesticide Alar. 82 The final category consists of cases in which the public
does not demand risk reduction at the same time that officials do not
want it. This category includes aggressive security measures in airports
before the attacks of 9/11.83 It is also a plausible account of the recent
situation with respect to climate change. In both cases, of course, the
wishes of the public and its representatives did not match the views of
84
most experts.
Of course these stylized categories ignore important variations. We
can identify cases in which the public does not merely fail to demand risk
reduction, but would affirmatively punish risk reduction efforts. Aggressive security measures at airports before 9/11 would probably have fallen
in this category, simply because such measures would have been deemed
a significant and unnecessary inconvenience-justified, if at all, in response to a highly speculative threat. In 2000, almost all travelers lacked
experience with terrorism, and hence the risk seemed at best unlikely
and abstract; any effort to impose restrictions of the sort that have now
become customary would have seemed ludicrously invasive. Where citizens would face a large burden from risk reduction, there is a built-in
obstacle to risk reduction, and bad outcomes or worst-case scenarios will
be ignored or downplayed. Citizens would almost certainly resist a large
increase in the gasoline tax, even if the increase were defended by reference to environmental concerns, the interest in energy self-sufficiency, or
some combination of the two.
We might be able to imagine cases in which many or most officials
would seek to block regulation even if the public demands it. At the very
least, officials might insist on a more tepid, less costly, and more symbolic
response than the public would like. In the aftermath of public concern
about toxic releases from chemical plants, for example, the legislative response involved disclosure requirements, not regulatory controls. 85 We
Valdez, Love Canal, and Three Mile Island in Shaping U.S. Environmental Law 1-42
(2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (exploring role of
Love Canal disaster in leading to legislation).
82. See Percival et al., supra note 42, at 387-93 (offering account of Alar incident);
Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True? 201-22 (1995) (discussing Alar scare and suggesting that
fears were not justified by reality). The ultimate response was a voluntary removal of Alar
from the market, after the EPA issued a "preliminary determination to cancel all food uses"
of the substance. Percival et al., supra note 42, at 391.
83. See Max H. Bazerman & Michael D. Watkins, Predictable Surprises 15-41 (2004)
(exploring factors leading to little in way of airport security precautions before 9/11).
84. On airport security, see id.; on climate change, see, e.g., Stern, supra note 7, at
vi-ix (noting consensus that some kind of international response to climate change is
desirable).
85. Hamilton notes:
[Congress] insert[ed] a reporting provision in the broader hazardous waste bill.
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA)
established the initial set of chemicals, industries, and facilities that would have to
provide the EPA with yearly reports on their toxic releases and transfers. The
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could also imagine cases in which the public helps to spur regulation,
perhaps through consumer behavior that reduces its ultimate cost, but in
a way that does not exactly conflict with the desires of officials.
Importantly, the category of "officials" contains a great deal of diversity. In the table above, the term is meant to refer to those with some
kind of formal position, and thus includes mayors, governors, presidents,
national and state legislators, and bureaucrats in various levels of government. As we have seen, there may well be disagreements or even conflicts
among state and national governments; and career bureaucrats may well
differ from elected officials, as indeed they have in the domains of both
national security and climate change. In addition, the public is hardly
monolithic. Internal divisions within the citizenry can greatly complicate
the political economy of risk reduction, not least when well-organized private groups ensure that government responses take their preferred form.
In the context of terrorism, the airline industry played a significant role
in preventing more extensive security procedures before 9/11.86 There
can be no doubt that powerful organizations have helped to discourage
87
aggressive measures to control greenhouse gas emissions.
There is an additional consideration. The public demand for regulatory controls is not simply a brute fact. Public opinion is affected by the
acts of both officials and well-organized groups. It shifts over time, often
in response to the statements and actions of influential people in private
and public institutions. Risk-related campaigns, in the private and public
sectors, might diminish or heighten public concern with respect to terrorism and climate change. Indeed, such campaigns might manipulate the
very variables that I shall be emphasizing here. The level of concern with
terrorism would inevitably have been high in the aftermath of the attacks
of 9/11. But it would have been possible for leaders to dampen that concern, especially as time passed, by (for example) giving assurances that
the risk was low and attempting to assimilate terrorism-related risks to

legislation also marked the first time that Congress required an agency to create a
publicly accessible electronic database ....
Hamilton, supra note 31, at 5.
86. See Bazerman & Watkins, supra note 83, at 26-31, 128-29 (suggesting that "the
U.S. airline industry successfully resisted government-mandated aviation security
improvements for decades, through its lobbying and campaign funding").
87. With respect to research, see Posner, supra note 5, at 53-57 (including suggestion
that research of many "global warming skeptics" has been "financed by the energy
industries" and "may not be very good research"). With respect to regulation, see Lee
Lane, The Political Economy of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Controls, in Punctuated Equilibrium
and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy 162, 165-66 (Robert Repetto ed., 2006)
[hereinafter Punctuated Equilibrium] (suggesting that powerful interest groups have
discouraged regulation of greenhouse gases); Robert Repetto, Introduction, in Punctuated
Equilibrium, supra, at 1, 17 (noting role of powerful private groups in climate change
debate).
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those encountered in ordinary life. 88 To say the least, American leaders

did not take this course, with President George W. Bush pointing to
worst-case scenarios and emphasizing instead that we are "still not safe"
and that ours is "a Nation in danger."89 By contrast, some nations, including Israel, have to some extent "normalized" terrorism-related risks.
It is well known that in response to certain deadly or troublesome incidents, tourists often react far more strongly than do people who regularly
90
live in the affected area.
To be sure, a degree of normalization may be easier with respect to
suicide bombers, whose destructive acts are fairly localized, than with respect to airplanes that fly into tall buildings, killing thousands of people.
But for the war on terror, prominent officials have played a large role in
activating and intensifying public concern, increasing the salience of the
9/11 attacks and invoking those attacks to stress the need for protective
measures. Whether or not they are justified, such measures can themselves help to form both beliefs and desires. Aggressive security measures
at airports, for example, may well serve to intensify public fear, in a way
that can heighten the demand for further precautions.
With respect to climate change, the most influential national leaders
in the United States have taken a quite different course. Far from activating concern, they have attempted to dampen it, if only by failing to say
much about the problem. Of course there are limits to the malleability of
public opinion, and we shall see that terrorism is far more likely to trigger
visceral fear than is climate change. But it is possible to imagine a situation in which the objective facts were the same, but in which American
leaders increased concern about climate change but decreased concern
about terrorism, to the point where the divergent attitudes were not quite
so divergent, at least after the lapse of several years post-9/ 11. Hence the
divergence is a product not only of simple facts, above all the 9/11 attacks, but also of political responses to both sets of risks. It is easily imaginable that influential leaders could take steps to heighten concern about
climate change in the years to come, perhaps by offering vivid narratives
of potential harm.

88. For a general argument in this direction, see Mueller, supra note 6, at 148-53
(arguing that politicians should seek to reduce anxiety about terrorism and put risks in
context).

89. Goodin, supra note 5, at 166.
90. See generally Thomas E. Drabek, Disaster Evacuation Behavior: Tourists and
Other Transients (1996) (examining evacuation behavior and identifying factors related to
behavioral variations between tourists and residents).
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II.

THE PSYCHOMETRIC PARADIGM AND AFFECT

A. QualitativeFactors and Risk
The "psychometric paradigm" has become one of the most influen92
9
tial accounts of risk perception in the social sciences, t including law.
The goal of the psychometric paradigm is to explain the divergence between the risk-related judgments of experts and those of ordinary people.
A major conclusion is that ordinary people show a "richer" rationality
than that of experts, who focus on quantities alone. 9 3 On this view, most
people are attuned to far more than the number of lives at stake. They
pay attention as well to a range of qualitatively distinctive factors, not reducible to mere numbers. For example, people are influenced by
whether a risk is potentially catastrophic, faced by future generations, involuntarily incurred, uncontrollable, delayed rather than immediate, and
particularly dreaded. 9 4 The psychometric paradigm purports to explain
why people are so fearful of the risks associated with pesticides, herbi95
cides, and nuclear power-risks that do not greatly concern experts.
The psychometric paradigm also claims to explain why people are not
much concerned about the risks associated with automobiles and x-raysrisks that many experts believe to be far from trivial. 9 6 When ordinary
people show a greater concern with nuclear power than with x-rays, it is
because the former poses risks that are delayed, involuntarily incurred,
97
potentially catastrophic, unfamiliar, and faced by future generations.
The psychometric approach can certainly claim to account for
heightened social concern with terrorism, which is likely to trigger the
standard grounds for "richer rationality." The risks associated with terrorism are particularly dreaded, and such risks have the uncontrollable,
unfamiliar, and potentially catastrophic qualities that are said to produce
intense reactions. But can the psychometric paradigm adequately explain the asymmetrical reactions to terrorism and climate change? At
first glance, it cannot. Indeed, it would be reasonable to say that if the
psychometric paradigm is right, then climate change should have a high
priority, perhaps even higher than terrorism. The risks associated with
91. See Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies (Ortwin Renn
& Bernd Rohrmann eds., 2000); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk [hereinafter Slovic,
Perception Essay], in The Perception of Risk 220, 222 (Paul Sovic ed., 2000) [hereinafter
Slovic, Perception of Risk] (outlining psychometric paradigm).
92. Clayton P. Gillette &James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1027, 1061-85 (1990) (defending idea of competing rationalities).
93. See Slovic, Perception Essay, supra note 91, at 231.
94. See Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of
Attitudes Toward Technological Risks and Benefits, in Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra
note 91, at 80, 99. For a discussion and critique, see Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk
99-119 (1997) (contending that psychometric factors do not, in fact, account for
divergence between lay and expert risk perceptions).
95. Slovic, Perception Essay, supra note 91, at 143-46.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 143-52.
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climate change are certainly delayed rather than immediate, and they are
imposed directly on subsequent generations, which might face catastrophe. At least as much as terrorism, the risks associated with climate
change are involuntarily incurred and uncontrollable.9" Such risks also
raise serious equitable concerns, since they will be faced by especially vulnerable people in poor nations, 9 9 as well as in developed nations. 10 0
Along the dimensions identified by the psychometric paradigm, climate
change and terrorism might be expected to trigger roughly equivalent
public concern. From the standpoint of the psychometric approach, it
could not easily be predicted that terrorism would trigger a greater reaction than climate change.
B. The Affect Heuristic
More recently, those interested in the psychometric paradigm have
explored the "affect heuristic"-a heuristic that is said to determine riskrelated thoughts and behavior. 10 1 On this view, people have rapid, immediate reactions to persons, activities, and processes, and the immediate
reaction operates as a mental shortcut for a more deliberative or analytic
assessment of the underlying issues. 10 2 Much of this work emphasizes the
existence of two families of cognitive operations, sometimes described as
System I and System II, with which risky activities and processes are evaluated. 10 3 System I is rapid, intuitive, and error-prone; System II is more
deliberative, calculative, slower, and more likely to be error-free. Heuristic-based thinking is rooted in System I; it is subject to override, under
certain conditions, by System 11.104 System I may, for example, lead peo98. On some of the difficulties here, see Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason 58-72
(2002) (attempting to explain puzzles raised by these ideas).
99. See Climate Change and Africa passim (Pak Sum Low ed., 2006) (exploring
distinctive risks faced by Africa); Thomas Schelling, Strategies of Commitment 34-35
(2006) (concluding that "most, nearly all, of the adverse effects of likely climate change
will accrue to the descendants of those living today in what we call 'developing
countries"'). The most sustained discussions areJ. Timmons Roberts & Bradley C. Parks, A
Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy (2007),
and Stem, supra note 7, at 82-84, 92-115.
100. Stern, supra note 7, at 131.
101. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and
Benefits [hereinafter Finucane, Affect Heuristic], in Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note
91, at 413.
102. Id. at 414-15.
103. Id. at 414.
104. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited:
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of
Intuitive Judgment 49, 51-52 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (exploring two systems).
The two systems need not be seen as occupying different physical spaces; they might even
be understood as heuristics (!). See id. There is, however, some evidence that different
sectors of the brain can be associated with Systems I and II. See the discussion of fear in
Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain 128-34 (1996), and the more general treatment in
Matthew D. Lieberman, Reflexive and Reflective Judgment Processes: A Social Cognitive
Neuroscience Approach, in SocialJudgments 44, 47-51 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2003).
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pie to be fearful of flying, or of large dogs, but System II might create a
deliberative check, ensuring an eventual conclusion that the risks are trivial. So too, System I might reflect little reason for concern about (say)
sunbathing, but System II might lead people to avoid undue exposure to
the sun for fear of skin cancer.
Considerable evidence suggests that immediate affective reactions do
help to explain people's judgments about risks. When asked to assess the
risks and benefits associated with certain items, people tend to say that
risky activities contain low benefits, and that beneficial activities contain
low risks. 10 5 Hence it may well be that "affect" comes first, and helps to
direct judgments of both risk and benefit. In support of this hypothesis,
note that when subjects are asked to make their assessments under time
pressure, the inverse correlation between risks and benefits is increaseda finding that strongly suggests that an affect heuristic, and System I, are
at work. 10 6 Consider also the fact that when people learn about the low
risks of an item, they are moved to think that the benefits are high-and
when they learn about the high benefits of an item, they are moved to
think that the risks are low. 10 7 In these ways, judgments about risks can
be connected with "the halo effect," which predicts that "the favorability
of the overall impression of an attitude object is a good predictor of how
strongly positive or negative qualities are ascribed to the object."' 0 8
It is tempting to think that the affect heuristic helps to explain the
asymmetry between terrorism and climate change. For many Americans,
the idea of terrorism conjures up intense images of disaster, as the idea of
climate change does not. 10 9 In general, "many of the climate change
risks may not be as viscerally unsettling to people as one might think."' 1 0
Even if people believe that terrorism-related risks are not greater, as a
statistical matter, than those associated with climate change, their affective reactions to the former are likely to be far more intense than their
affective reactions to the latter. The claim seems right; the idea of terrorism typically does produce more intense emotions than the idea of climate change. The problem is that this difference itself remains to be
explained. Affect is not simply given; it has sources. In this context, use
105. Finucane, Affect Heuristic, supra note 101, at 415-16.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 426. Compare student course evaluations. Among teachers, it is informal
lore that when a particular class likes the instructor, the evaluation of all enumerated items
will improve, including such items as course materials, even when they stay constant from
year to year. For an entertaining example of a halo effect, see Brian Wansink, Mindless
Eating 21-24 (2006) (showing that people given wine labeled "California" much liked
meal that was not much liked by people who were given wine labeled "North Dakota," even
though meal and wine were identical).
109. See Leiserowitz, Communicating, supra note 41 (manuscript at 8) (concluding
from study that Americans find climate change to be "moderate risk").
110. Abbasi, supra note 18, at 26.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:503

of the affect heuristic appears to be as much a redescription of different
public reactions as an explanation of those differences.
It is not impossible to imagine a society, not unrecognizably different
from our own, in which the affect heuristic leads to much greater concern with climate change than with terrorism, or at least equivalent concern. If events related to climate change were familiar and salient, and if
events related to terrorism were not, the divergence in reactions would
run in a different direction. Indeed, there is no need to use our imagination. Among some groups, climate change already does produce extremely intense concern, probably equal to or greater than that associated with terrorism."'1 I will explore this point below; 1 2 for the moment,
let us turn to a more conventional account of risk perception.
III. BENEFITS, COSTS,

AND RATIONAL CHOICE

I shall be arguing that identifiable features of bounded rationality
help to explain the divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate change. But no one denies that most people engage in at least
some kind of weighing of benefits and costs. If citizens believe that they
have much to gain and little to lose from risk regulation, they will favor
risk regulation; leaders should be expected to respond to what citizens
believe, and their own judgments are influenced by an intuitive kind of
cost-benefit analysis as well. Perhaps the cost-benefit ratio is simply perceived to be better for certain reductions of terrorist threats than for aggressive efforts to reduce the risks associated with climate change. Of
course many people believe that the United States has moral obligations
to poorer nations, which are distinctly threatened by climate change. But
perhaps moral obligations are insufficient to motivate expensive regulatory requirements. If so, those interested in imposing those requirements
must speak in other terms.
Let us see, then, whether it is possible to explain the divergent
American reactions to terrorism and climate change by reference to widespread judgments about benefits and costs.
A. Benefits
Americans might well believe that they have far more to gain from
efforts to reduce the risks of terrorism than from efforts to reduce the
risks of climate change. Perhaps bad or catastrophic worst-case scenarios
are more likely for the former than for the latter. To be sure, much depends on the specific measures that are proposed. But the simplest claim
here would be that even if significant climate change is already occurring,
111. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein
on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1085-87 (2006) (reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, Law of Fear:
Beyond the Precautionary Principle (2005)) (discussing "influence of cultural world view
on perceptions of environmental risks").
112. See infra notes 246-252 and accompanying text.
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its harmful effects will not be significant in the United States." t 3 That
claim is contested, to be sure; but if Americans doubt the risk of serious
harm, they might well resist significant or costly regulatory responses. In
the face of such doubts, some people have argued that the best response
to existing concerns involves continued research, especially if little is to
14
be gained by acting now rather than a few years from now.'
With respect to terrorism, by contrast, it is difficult to say that the risk
is not real or that it is too speculative to warrant immediate action. To be
sure, particular risk-reduction strategies might be questioned-on the
ground, for example, that certain surveillance programs will not have significant effects, or that some steps increase risks on balance."15 But it is
hard to argue that with respect to terrorism, the best approach is one of
"learn, then act."
Current evidence strongly suggests that Americans believe that they
have relatively little to gain from efforts to control climate change. In
2006, a large majority of Americans said both that climate change is "already happening" and that climate change does not pose a "serious
threat" to them or their way of life in their lifetime. 16 In 2006, another
poll found that two-thirds of Americans believe that climate change will
not create a serious danger in their lifetime.1 17 In 2000, a sample of people was asked, "Which of the following are you most concerned about?
The impacts of global warming on ... (1) you and your family; (2) your
local community; (3) the U.S. as a whole; (4) people all over the world;
(5) non-human nature; or (6) not at all concerned."' 8 Nearly 70% of
113. See Olivier Deschenes & Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate
Change: Evidence from Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in Weather 32
(2006),
at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1237&
PHPSESSID=abaca07c15515533a459adcedc81fcd3 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(finding that effect on American agriculture might actually be favorable). Compare this to
the suggestion in Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 97, that "the economic impact of
gradual climate change (that is, omitting catastrophic outcomes) is close to zero for a
moderate (2.5' C) global warming." A more recent and different view is sketched in Stern,
supra note 7, at 130 (offering optimistic and pessimistic cases for United States, with
pessimistic case involving loss of 1.2% GDP for 3' C warming and noting that pessimistic
case does not take full account of effects of extreme weather events, such as hurricanes).
Note that this conclusion does not come to terms with the economic effects on the United
States that would come from the very fact of serious economic harms in other nations.
114. See Mendelsohn, supra note 15, at 44-47 (arguing that it may well make sense to
wait before instituting aggressive controls); Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 98 (same).
This conclusion is vigorously challenged in Houghton, supra note 10, at 227-30 (arguing
for immediate action); Stern, supra note 7, at 193, 202-03 (arguing that ten-year delay
could make it impracticable to stabilize emissions at desirable level).
115. For a superb discussion, see generally Jessica Stern & Jonathan Wiener,
Precaution Against Terrorism, 9 J. Risk Res. 393 (2006) (exploring risks created both by
terrorism and by precautions against terrorism).
116. Gallup Poll, supra note 66.
117. See Lydia Saad, Gallup News Serv., Americans Still Not Highly Concerned About
Global Warming, Apr. 7, 2006 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
118. Leiserowitz, Communicating, supra note 41 (manuscript at 5-6).
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respondents answered (4) or (5), and only 13% answered (1) or (2). It is
thus apparent that in the recent past, Americans have generally thought
that they are not themselves at risk as a result of climate change. 1 9 In
their view, the principal risks are faced by those in other nations, or future generations, or by the environment in general. 120 Thus the health
effects of climate change are not believed to be large enough to motivate
12 1
behavior.
Compare in this regard a cross-national study of perceptions of risk
associated with terrorism.' 22 Americans estimated their personal chance
of serious harm from terrorism in the next year as 8.27%-to say the
least, a significant risk. For obvious reasons, the objective risks from ter1 23
rorism are difficult to calculate, but the figure seems wildly inflated.
To the extent that Americans believe that they do face a risk of 8.27%,
they will readily support aggressive protective measures. Recall here the
evidence that substantial numbers of Americans are worried about the
risk that a terrorist attack will affect themselves, or their loved ones, in the
near future.
There is thus reason to believe that Americans think that they have
far more to gain from controls on terrorism than from controls on climate change; the personal risk, to those now living, is perceived as much
higher from terrorism than from climate change. Some specialists offer
supportive findings. For example, a respected study finds that extremely
little would be lost by a ten-year delay in emissions reductions. 12 4 Perhaps this judgment is wrong. 125 But even if it is wrong, current doubts
about the personal benefits of climate change policies help to explain
divergent public reactions. The pattern of regulation is influenced by
this fact.
B. Costs
Perhaps those who show greater concern with terrorism believe, at
least intuitively, that the costs of reducing climate change are likely to be
119. See Abbasi, supra note 18, at 144 ("A greater focus on how the consequences of
climate change brush up against the lives and values of those who have so far been
indifferent or opposed to action is critical to creating a larger base of concern.").
120. For a contrary view, see U.S. Global Change Research Program, Climate Change
Impacts on the United States (2000), available at http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/
nationalassessment/overviewconclusions.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
121. See Abbasi, supra note 18, at 190.
122. See generally Neal Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks:
A Cross-National Comparison, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 991 (2004) (studying American and
Canadian risk perceptions with respect to terrorism and SARS).
123. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Case for Fear, New Republic, Dec. 11, 2006, at 29
(offering statistics suggesting that risk of dying in terrorist attack is, or at least has been,
very low).
124. See Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 127 (describing potential net economic
loss as "trivially small").
125. See Stern, supra note 7, at 193, 208.

2007]

TERRORISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE

very high-plausibly higher than the costs of reducing the risk of terrorism. Or perhaps Americans oppose significant steps to control climate
change to the extent that the costs are high. When the costs are visible,
the argument for responding to the problem is weakened, and people are
likely to seek extremely good evidence that it is worth worrying about the
underlying risks.
To be sure, cost comparisons are difficult in the abstract. Here as
elsewhere, everything depends on the particular steps at issue. The war
in Iraq, motivated in large part by the risk of terrorism, has been extremely expensive, easily exceeding $350 billion for the United States
alone. 126 As I have noted, the cost of the Iraq War to the United States is
now greater than the total expected cost of the Kyoto Protocol, and
before long the cost of the Iraq War will dwarf that expected cost. 127 At
the same time, it is possible to imagine modest steps to control greenhouse gases that would not be terribly expensive.' 28 But perhaps significant reductions in the risk of terrorism can be undertaken at reasonable
cost, and perhaps the same is not true of climate change. On this view,
the divergent public reactions reflect a kind of informal cost-benefit analysis, in accordance with which an awareness of the magnitude of the costs
is doing a great deal of work.
There is almost undoubtedly something to this explanation. If the
risk of climate change could be significantly reduced for $10 million, or
with an annual tax increase of $1 on every American, much more would
be done to combat climate change. As we shall see, American enthusiasm
for the Montreal Protocol offers strong evidence on this count. 129 A
demonstration that climate change could be reduced at low cost would
30
undoubtedly increase American enthusiasm for risk reduction efforts.'
Note in this regard that in the abstract, Americans broadly support the
Kyoto Protocol and strong efforts to combat climate change-but their
enthusiasm sharply diminishes as they are asked to incur costs to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. In the context of terrorism, people may well
believe that they are themselves unlikely to incur significant costs from

126. See Linda Bilmes & Joseph Stiglitz, The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An
Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 12054) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that
by November 2005 Congress has already appropriated approximately $251 billion for
military operations in Iraq); National Priorities Project, at http://nationalpriofities.org/
index.php?option=comwrapper&Itemid=182 (last visited Jan. 16, 2007) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (reporting cost in excess of $359 billion on January 16, 2007).
127. See supra text accompanying note 69.
128. The methane program is an example. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
129. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
130. Note that proponents of the McCain-Lieberman proposal, which would have
capped greenhouse gas emissions in the United States at 2000 levels, emphasized a study
purporting to show relatively low costs from full implementation. See Paltsev et al., supra
note 18, at 26-27.
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risk reduction efforts-except, perhaps, in the form of increased waiting
lines at airports.
Consider the recorded views of Americans about environmental protection and climate change in the late 1990s. Sixty-three percent of
Americans agreed with the following statement: "Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high
and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of
cost. 1' 3 1 In the same general vein, 59% supported the Kyoto Protocol,
with only 21% opposed. 13 2 But in the same period, 52% of Americans
said that they would refuse to support the Kyoto Protocol if it would cost
an extra $50 per month for an average American household. 133 In fact
only 11% of Americans would support the Kyoto Protocol if the monthly
expense were $100 or more. 13 4 As I have noted, polls find that
Americans are skeptical of increased energy and gasoline taxes designed
to reduce climate change-though they do favor regulatory mandates on
power companies.' 3 5 How can we explain strong majority support for
"environmental improvements.., regardless of cost" and strong majority
136
rejection of environmental improvements when the cost is high?
The answer lies in the fact that people are not, in fact, willing to
spend an infinite amount for environmental improvements. When the
costs are placed squarely "on screen," people begin to weigh both costs
and benefits, and their enthusiasm for regulatory expenditures diminishes. 13 7 Hence Americans believe that car companies should be required to take steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, without also being willing to spend a great deal, if anything, in increased gasoline prices.
Surveys in Europe suggest that significant numbers of citizens are willing
to pay something to reduce the risks of climate change; but even there,
the amount is not extremely high. 138 Among all people between the ages
of 15 and 64, only about 20% are willing to pay more for gasoline to
reduce environmental harm, and among that group, the average willingness to pay is an increase of 2.3%, or 11.5 cents per liter. 13 9 For citizens
as well as leaders, an intuitive assessment of costs and benefits plays a
large role in determining the level of precautions actually sought.
131. See Program on int'l Pol'y Attitudes, Americans on the Global Warming Treaty
17-18 & fig.14, available at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/ClimateChange/Global
WarmingNovOO/GlobalWarmingNov00rpt.pdf (last updated Feb. 4, 2000) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
132. Id. at 10-11 & fig.7.
133. Id. at 18-19 & fig.15.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
136. Program on Int'l Pol'y Attitudes, supra note 131, at 18 & fig.14.
137. For a detailed discussion of this point in connection with risk perception, see
Margolis, supra note 94, at 124-31.
138. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi &Joni Hirsch, The Generational Divide in Support for
Climate Change Policies: European Evidence, 77 Climatic Change 121, 124-25 (2006).
139. Id.
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Return here to the government's decision, in the 1990 Clean Air Act,
to take extremely aggressive steps to control acid deposition. 140 Those
steps became possible only after the creation of an ambitious emissions
trading program reduced the anticipated costs of emissions controls;
hence those who would otherwise be inclined to oppose the program
found it acceptable. 4 1 There is a similar pattern with American enthusi142
asm for steps to decrease depletion of the ozone layer.
C. American Costs, Foreign Benefits
According to some prominent estimates, the most serious damage
from climate change is not likely to be felt in the United States. 143 On
some estimates, American agriculture will actually be a net winner as a
result of climate change. 144 On other estimates, Americans as a whole
45
will be net losers, but not nearly to the same extent as other nations."
These estimates fit public perceptions, for Americans believe that other
nations have more to lose from climate change than the United States
does. American behavior is likely to be much affected by any finding that
citizens in other nations have much more to gain from regulatory protection than Americans do. Consider the fact that a "revealed preference"
study of American taxation and foreign aid suggests that a citizen of the
poorest nations is valued at 1/2000 an American life. 1 4 6 If Americans
believe that people in India and South Africa, rather than Florida and
New York, are at serious risk, they will be far less likely to act.
Some of the most systematic analyses suggest that the United States
stands to lose much more, and to gain much less, from aggressive regula140. For an overview, see A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean Air 253-96
(2000) (showing that trading program greatly reduced anticipated and actual costs).
141. See id.; Esterling, supra note 79, at 128-29.
142. See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 17 (manuscript at 4) (showing
that favorable cost-benefit ratio helped ensure American support for Montreal Protocol).
143. See Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 96-97; Stern, supra note 7, at 93-99,
128-31.
144. Compare Deschenes & Greenstone, supra note 113, passim (finding that climate
change might actually help American agriculture), with the suggestion in Nordhaus &
Boyer, supra note 5, at 97, that "the economic impact of gradual climate change (that is,
omitting catastrophic outcomes) is close to zero for a moderate (2.50 C) global warming."
Note that this conclusion does not come to terms with the economic effects on the United
States that would result from the very fact of serious economic harms in other nations;
such harms might well adversely affect the United States as well, among other things
because of a reduction in the demand for goods and services produced here.
145. See Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 91 (showing that United States will lose
far less, as percentage of GDP, than India and African nations, from 2.5' C warming);
Stern, supra note 7, at 130 (offering optimistic and pessimistic projections for United
States).
146. See Wojciech Kopszuk et al., The Limitations of Decentralized World
Redistribution: An Optimal Taxation Approach, 49 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1051, 1054 (2005).
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tion than European nations do.' 47 For the United States, the likely costs
of the Kyoto Protocol have been projected to exceed its likely benefits,
with a total cost of $325 billion. 148 The picture for the world as a whole is
mixed but more promising, with Europe anticipated to be a net gainer,
and with Russia likely to gain an especially large amount. 1 49 Hence those
nations that favor aggressive controls on greenhouse gases, and that have
shown enthusiasm for the Kyoto Protocol, are responding in large part to
the fact that they can expect to gain a great deal and to spend relatively
little. Indeed, almost all Eastern European nations have easily met their
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, in large part because their emis150
sions allowances greatly exceeded their likely emissions in any case.
The Kyoto Protocol was supported by many nations for which its requirements were not expected to be burdensome. 15 1 When the costs are so
low, regulation will seem attractive if leaders and citizens are even mildly
concerned about the risks of climate change.
At the present time, some people believe that the United States will
be able to handle the costs of climate change,'152 and hence that expensive precautions are hard to justify simply from the standpoint of national
self-interest. If this is so, then intuitive cost-benefit balancing helps to
explain the source of the official position of the United States. The key
point is that aggressive regulation seems, to many, to be a kind of foreign
aid program,' 53 one that is not self-evidently in the national self-interest.
Of course the problem of terrorism is not comparable to climate change
on this count. While efforts to control terrorism are likely to benefit
other nations, the principal goal is to protect the United States itself.
147. Stern, supra note 7, at 93-99, 128-31 (describing effects for various nations and
regions and showing comparatively less, though still significant, vulnerability for United
States).
148. Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 161. I am not taking this particular number
as canonical; of course technologies change, and it is possible that any particular
projection will be inflated. I refer to this number as suggestive of the general perception
that significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will be costly for the United States.
149. Id. at 161-63.
150. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change 20 (1998), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (listing emissions limitations for each country as
percentage of 1990 emissions); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Key GHG Data, supra note 65, at 16-17 (listing annual CO 2 emissions of various
countries from 1990 to 2003).
151. Richard E. Benedick, Morals and Myths: A Commentary on Global Climate
Policy, WZB-Mitteilungen, Sept. 2005, at 15, 15-16 [hereinafter Benedick, Morals and
Myths].
152. See, e.g., Deschenes & Greenstone, supra note 113, at 2 (estimating that "climate
change will lead to $1.1 billion (2002$) or 3.4% increase in annual agricultural sector
profits").
153. In principle, this understanding seems doubtful, in part because the United
States is responsible for a large part of the problem. If climate change is seen as a kind of
tort committed by wealthy nations against poor ones, the notion that greenhouse gas
abatement is "foreign aid" will seem far less plausible.
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D. Present Costs, Future Benefits
Perhaps the real difference lies in the temporal incidence of costs and
benefits.' 54 Consider the following question: "Do you think climate
change is an urgent problem that requires immediate government action,
or a longer-term problem that requires more study before government
action is taken?" More Americans believe that the problem is "longer55
term" than "urgent."'
For climate change, it is both tempting and reasonable to believe
that the largest costs of risk reduction will be felt immediately, whereas
the benefits will be received mostly by those in the future. Whatever their
stated moral commitments, current citizens may turn out to be unwilling
to pay a great deal to help those who will follow them. Perhaps current
citizens are rationally discounting the future, believing that harms in fifty
years do not deserve the same attention as harms today.1 56 Perhaps citizens are assuming that if risks will not be incurred for several or many
decades, they might not be incurred at all, simply because technological
advances will provide a solution. Perhaps they are using an implausibly
high discount rate to assess future benefits.1 5 7 Perhaps they are being
unrealistically optimistic, or reducing cognitive dissonance, believing that
a probabilistic harm in the future will not come to fruition at all, or will
not be particularly bad if it does. Or they might be simply self-interested,
treating future generations as a kind of foreign country. Thomas
Schelling expressly argues that "[g] reenhouse gas abatement is a foreign
aid program, not a saving-investment problem of the familiar kind." 158
And if political actors are responsive to their citizens, it is most unlikely
that they will impose high current costs for long term gains. By the time
the largest benefits of risk reduction are generally felt by the public, those
politicians will be out of office and indeed long dead.
Here, then, is a substantial difference between the risk of terrorism
and the risk of climate change. Every politician has a strong political as
well as personal incentive to take steps to prevent terrorist attacks. If such
an attack occurs "on his watch," the likelihood of political reprisal is high.
The risk of such an attack is immediate. By contrast, the political incentives to attend to the long-term risk of climate change are much weaker.
It is far less likely that there will be a climate change "incident" on the
154. See Bazerman & Watkins, supra note 83, at 84-87, 238-39 (emphasizing that
delayed nature of climate change risk diminishes public demand for regulatory controls).
155. See ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Sept. 23-27, 2005, at http://www.polling
report.com/enviro.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that 47% of
respondents believe global warming is "longer-term" problem, whereas 41% believe it to be
an "urgent" problem).
156. For a good but technical discussion of discounting, see Stern, supra note 7, at
43-52.
157. On the underlying issues, see Discounting and Intergenerational Equity (Paul R.
Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999); Symposium, Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus,
and the Law and Economics of Consumer Choice, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
158. Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, supra note 3, at 99-100.
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watch of, or easily attributable to, any current politician. 1 59 To justify
public concern, or the imposition of immediate costs, such a politician
must trigger moral commitments, which may not be so easy to do. If
moral commitments do not operate as an impetus for costly controls, a
politician who attempts to regulate greenhouse gases might be imposing
visible and significant costs on current voters for the benefit of future
people who will never be able to reward that particular politician with
their electoral support. Such politicians might well be heroic, but it
might well be surprising to see heroes of that particular sort.
E. Rational Choice? A Summary and Some Doubts
We now seem to have the ingredients of a plausible explanation of
the divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate change. With
respect to climate change, the benefits of aggressive regulation are plausibly disputed and the costs are plausibly high, certainly for the United
States. The benefits are likely to be enjoyed disproportionately by other
nations and not in the near future. The analysis is very different for terrorism, where Americans appreciate the worst-case scenarios, perceive
themselves as peculiarly at risk, and believe that the benefits of risk reduction will be felt largely in the United States and by current generations.
For some efforts to reduce the risk of terrorism, it is certainly possible to
question whether the benefitsjustify the costs; but the judgment, intuitive
or more reflective, is that many expensive measures are worthwhile.
But this explanation is not adequate. Recall that on September 10,
2001, terrorism was far from a high priority item for Americans-and that
the year before the attacks, literally 0% of the public counted terrorism as
the nation's leading problem! 160 By contrast, many specialists believed,
for a period preceding the attack, that the risk of terrorism was foolishly
neglected in light of a rational assessment of costs and benefits-and
hence that the attacks were a kind of "predictable surprise.1116 1 On this
view, the neglect was a product of "unavailability bias," in which the absence of cognitively available incidents of harm made people unreasonably indifferent to the risk. Note in this regard that in the eighteen
months following the 9/11 attacks, between 15% and 30% of the public
continued to name terrorism as the nation's most important problemand the "fluctuations closely track[ed] the frequency of television news
stories concerning terrorism."' 6 2 Here, too, is a tribute to the power of
the availability heuristic.
159. Hurricane Katrina is a possible exception, in light of efforts to connect its
magnitude with global warming. But those efforts failed, and the failures are instructive: It
is bound to be difficult to connect particular weather-related events with global warming in
general.
160. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 135.
161. See Bazerman & Watkins, supra note 83, at 15-18.
162. Goodin, supra note 5, at 135.
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Perhaps the post-9/11 reaction is simply a form of rational updating
on the part of Americans; the attacks themselves certainly provided information about the immediacy and magnitude of the threat. With respect
to ordinary citizens, this account is not implausible. 163 But as an explanation of the behavior of the United States, much more was almost certainly
involved, because officials had the information to justify more aggressive
security measures well before 9/11.164 To understand the missing ingredients, it is necessary to venture well beyond a simple analysis of costs and
benefits, and to say something about the nature of human cognition.
IV. BOUNDEDLY

RATIONAL

FEAR

It would certainly be optimistic to suppose that risk perception, and
responses to the dangers associated with terrorism and climate change,
are generally a product of rational balancing of costs and benefits. With
respect to terrorism, vivid and concrete images play a large role in people's judgments. The very idea of terrorism conjures up the attacks of
9/11, or perhaps even worse. Climate change is entirely different. It
might well produce no images at all. According to one study, "most
Americans lacked vivid, concrete, and personally-relevant affective images
of climate change, which helps explain why climate change remains a
relatively low priority national or environmental issue. 1 65 This finding
provides an important clue to risk perception in general; it also casts a
distinctive light on the divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate change.
Judgments about risks come from two different pathways. 166 Sometimes people's judgments are rooted in their own experience. Has a bad
outcome come to fruition in the recent past? Has that outcome been
experienced personally, as in an encounter with violent crime or serious
illness? If an outcome has not been experienced personally, has an occurrence nonetheless been highly visible and salient? Alternatively, judgments might emerge from statistical accounts of one kind or another.
People might learn, for example, that a shift to a better diet can decrease
a risk of heart disease by a certain amount, or that a reduction in sulfur
dioxide emissions is likely to reduce asthma attacks by a specified percentage, or that decreased sun exposure is likely to decrease the risk of skin
cancer.
People's judgments are affected by both of these pathways, but personal experience is typically far more effective in motivating behavior.
163. For a skeptical view, see Mueller, supra note 6, at 1-3 (arguing Americans are
overly fearful of terrorism given small probabilities involved).

164. See Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission
Report 255-77 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/
91lReport.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing increased level of
reporting in intelligence community of potential security threats in months before 9/11).
165. Leiserowitz, Climate, supra note 41, at 55.
166. See Weber, supra note 14, at 106-08.
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And when direct personal experience is lacking, vivid images of harm can
operate as a surrogate for actual experience. Recall the earlier discussion
of the two families of cognitive operations, System I and System 11.167 System I might well be triggered by easily accessible images, even when people have not faced the relevant risks in daily life.
For many Americans, the idea of terrorism conjures up intense
images of disaster, as the idea of climate change does not. 16 8 Indeed,
White House officials under President Bush asked executive officials to
use the term "climate change" in preference to "global warming," evidently with the belief that "climate change" is abstract and relatively neutral-though even the idea of "global warming" does not appear especially frightening. 169 (Maybe warmer is better?) In the United States, the
high salience of the 9/11 attacks made the relevant harms easy to imagine and in an important sense quite personal. Even if people could be
convinced that terrorism-related risks are not greater, as a statistical matter, than those associated with climate change, their affective reactions to
the former would likely be far more intense than their affective reactions
to the latter.
Of course affective responses are not simply given; they have sources.
Before the attacks of 9/11, Americans were not worried much about terrorism, and among some groups, climate change does produce intense
concern, almost certainly equal to or greater than that associated with
terrorism. To understand why this is the exception rather than the rule,
we need to offer some details about why, exactly, terrorism generally produces an acute reaction and climate change generally does not.
A. The Availability Heuristic
1. Availability in General. - It is well established that in thinking
about risks, people rely on certain heuristics, or rules of thumb, which
serve to simplify their inquiry. 170 Heuristics typically work through a process of "attribute substitution," in which people answer a hard question by
substituting an easier one. 171 Should Americans be fearful of hurricanes,
nuclear power, mad cow disease, alligator attacks, or avian flu? When
people use the availability heuristic, they assess the magnitude of risks by
asking whether examples can readily come to mind. 172 For example, "a
167. See supra Part II.B.
168. Cf. Abbasi, supra note 18, at 26 ("[M]any of the climate change risks may not be
as viscerally unsettling to people as one might think.").
169. See Weber, supra note 14, at 106 ("[T]he Bush White House has instructed its
departments and agencies to use the more neutral term 'climate change' instead of 'global
warming."').
170. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (exploring role of heuristics in
people's judgments about probability).
171. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 104, at 49, 53-60.
172. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 170, at 3, 11-14.
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class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more numerous than
a class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable."'1 73 If people can easily think of relevant examples, they are far more likely to be
frightened and concerned than if they cannot. Consider a simple study
showing people a list of well-known men and women, and asking them
whether the list contains more names of women or more names of men.
In lists in which the men were especially famous, people thought that
there were more names of men, whereas in lists in which the women were
the more famous, people thought that there were more names of
74

women. 1

This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. A risk that is familiar, like that associated with terrorism in the
aftermath of 9/11, will be seen as more serious than a risk that is less
familiar, like that associated with sunbathing or hotter summers. But salience is important as well. "For example, the impact of seeing a house
burning on the subjective probability of such accidents is probably
75
greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper.'
Thus vivid and easily imagined causes of death (e.g., tornadoes) receive
likelihood estimates that are similar to those of less vivid causes (e.g.,
asthma attacks) that occur with a far greater frequency (here a factor of
20).176 So too, recent events will have a greater impact than earlier ones.
Consider here a study of how people are affected by their personal
experience with low probability events. 177 When the rare events actually
did occur, they had a far larger impact on people's decisions than could
be justified by objective analysis. But most of the time, people's behavior
was less affected by the possibility of those events than an objective analysis warranted. The reason was that the events were, by definition, rareand not having encountered them, people concluded that such events
could be ignored. On the basis of personal experience, then, the pattern
was one of simultaneous overreaction and underreaction to rare eventswith the former occurring in the immediate aftermath of personal
experience.
The point helps explain differences across time and space in much
risk-related behavior, including both public and private decisions to take
precautions. If floods have not occurred in the immediate past, people
1 78
who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance.
Whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly affected
173. Id. at 11.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J.
Experimental Psychol.: Hum. Learning & Memory 551, 555, 556-57 tbl.2 (1978).
177. Elke U. Weber et al., Predicting Risk-Sensitivity in Humans and Lower Animals:
Risk as Variance or Coefficient of Variation, 111 Psychol. Rev. 430 (2004).
178. Id.
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by recent experiences. 1 79 In the aftermath of an earthquake, insurance
for earthquakes rises sharply-but it declines steadily from that point, as
80
vivid memories recede.1
What, in particular, produces availability? An illuminating essay,
with important implications for divergent reactions to terrorism and climate change, attempts to test the effects of ease of imagery on perceived
judgments of risk.1 81 The study asked subjects to read about an illness
(Hyposcenia-B) that "was becoming increasingly prevalent" on the local
campus.1 8 2 In one condition, the symptoms were vague and hard to imagine, involving an inflamed liver, a malfunctioning nervous system, and
a general sense of disorientation. In another condition, the symptoms
were concrete and easy to imagine-involving muscle aches, low energy,
and frequent severe headaches. Subjects in both conditions were asked
to imagine a three-week period in which they had the disease and to write
a detailed description of what they imagined. After doing so, subjects
were asked to assess, on a ten-point scale, their likelihood of contracting
the disease. The basic finding was that likelihood judgments were very
different in the two conditions, with easily imagined symptoms making
people far more inclined to believe that they were likely to get the
disease.
The importance of the availability heuristic emerges from a crossnational study of perceptions of risk associated with terrorism and
SARS.1 8 3 Americans perceived terrorism to be a far greater threat, to
themselves and to others, than SARS; Canadians perceived SARS to be a
greater threat, to themselves and to others, than terrorism. 184 Canadians
estimated their chance of serious harm from SARS as 7.43%, significantly
higher than their estimate for terrorism (6.04%).185 Americans estimated their risk of serious harm from terrorism as about four times as
high as their estimate of their risk of serious harm from SARS (2.18%).186
These findings are understandable in light of the fact that Canadians
have experienced no incidents of terrorism but a significant number of
179. See Paul Slovic, Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in Slovic,
Perception of Risk, supra note 91, at 40 ("[I] ndividuals 'are strongly conditioned by their
immediate past and limit their extrapolation to simplified constructs, seeing the future as a
mirror of the past.'" (quoting Robert W. Kates, Hazard and Choice Perception in Flood
Plain Management 88 (1962))).
180. Id.
181. Steven J. Sherman et al., Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived
Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery, in
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 98 (Thomas Gilovich et al.
eds., 2002).
182. Id. at 99.
183. See Feigenson et al., supra note 122, at 995-99 (summarizing results of student
survey).
184. Id. at 995.
185. Id. at 996.
186. Id.
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cases of SARS-whereas Americans have experienced a serious terrorist
87
attack but no cases of SARS.1
Note that the use of the availability heuristic, in these contexts, is
hardly irrational. 188 What has happened before seems, much of the time,
to be the best available guide to what will happen again. The problem is
that the availability heuristic can lead to significant errors, in terms of
both excessive fear and neglect. The problem of neglect is especially serious when citizens face a potentially catastrophic low-probability risk that
1 89
has not come to fruition in the recent past.
2. Availability, Terrorism, and Climate Change. - If the availability heuristic plays a large role in people's risk-related judgments, then we might
have a simple explanation for the asymmetry in American reactions: Because of the attacks of 9/11, an available incident drives people's
probability judgments with respect to terrorism, whereas there is no such
incident with respect to climate change. The vividness and salience of
the incident helps to ensure continuing concern about terrorism-related
risks. The worst-case scenarios, or at least some bad case scenarios, are
easily brought to mind.
To see the point, consider what would happen if in 2000, a candidate
for public office had made the risk of terrorism a central issue in a political campaign. Such a candidate would likely have seemed to have an odd
sense of priorities-focusing on a distant and apparently unrealistic
threat, one that could not possibly have resonated in the minds of voters.
Or suppose that in 2000, a member of Congress had aggressively argued
for much of the same legislation that followed the attacks of 9/11, including increased security measures at airports and new presidential authority
to find and to detain suspected terrorists. There is no question that Congress would have rejected any such effort; indeed, a legislator who argued
for it would probably have seemed to be an alarmist and a threat to civil
liberties, perhaps even a crank. In 2000, the public was no more focused
on terrorism-related risks than on the risks associated with climate
change. The attacks of 9/11 made all the difference.
The point is quite general. Risk-reduction legislation is often fueled
by identifiable crises, bringing worst-case scenarios vividly to mind. Legis187. Id. at 995.
188. Tversky and Kahneman emphasize that the heuristics they identify "are highly
economical and usually effective," but also that they "lead to systematic and predictable
errors." Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 170, at 20. Gerd Gigerenzer, among others, has
emphasized that some heuristics can work extremely well. See generally Gerd Gigerenzer,
Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (2000) (discussing success of several
heuristics); Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (1999) (same).
He has used this point as a rejoinder to those who stress the errors introduced by heuristics
and biases. For present purposes, it is not necessary to take a stand on the resulting
debates. Even if many heuristics mostly work well in daily life, a sensible government can
do much better than to rely on them.
189. See Bazerman & Watkins, supra note 83, at 91-93 (discussing effects of vividness
of information).
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lation calling for disclosure of toxic releases was spurred by a chemical
accident at Bhopal, India, which "focuse [d] media attention on chemical
safety and stimulated Congress members to introduce right-to-know legislation." 190 The relevant legislation could not possibly have been enacted
without the highly publicized Bhopal disaster.' 9' Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE), requiring fuel economy for motor vehicles, was a product of the Arab oil embargo and the nationally publicized "energy crisis";
without the crisis, the fuel economy legislation would have been
unimaginable. 9 2 The international effort to reduce ozone-depleting
chemicals was spurred by the publicity given to a large ozone "hole" over
93
Antarctica.
Often the available incidents are a product of presentations by influential actors. Silent Spring, by Rachel Carson,' 94 helped to spur national
controls on pesticides and, indeed, the environmental movement and
other legislation as well. Indeed, Carson's book, with its vivid narratives
of harmful chemicals, may well have played a role in the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency. 195 The point is that Carson did not
offer a dry analysis of the costs and benefits of pesticides; her narrative
method made particular events highly salient to its readers.
Availability affects public perceptions in general. Within the United
States, public concern about risks usually tracks changes in the actual
fluctuations in those risks. But public concern outruns actual fluctuations in the important case of "panics," bred by vivid illustrations that do
not reflect changes in levels of danger. 19 6 At certain points in the 1970s
and 1980s, there were extreme leaps in concern about teenage suicides,
herpes, illegitimacy, and AIDS-leaps that did not correspond to changes
in the size of the problem. Availability, produced by "a particularly vivid
case or new finding that receives considerable media attention," played a
major role in those leaps in public concern. 197 In 2006, three incidents
of alligator attacks led citizens of Florida to be "suddenly hypervigilant to
a danger that seemed to be lurking in every body of fresh water bigger
than a bathtub. Calls to hotlines skyrocketed, and all over the state peo190. Hamilton, supra note 31, at 184.
191. See id. at 178-91 (noting fluctuating public concern with toxic waste and media
coverage of Toxics Release Inventory Program).
192. Cf. James A. Dunn, Jr., Automobile Fuel Efficiency Policy: Beyond the CAFE
Controversy, in Punctuated Equilibrium, supra note 87, at 197, 198-201 (describing
subsequent business and government resistance to expansion of CAFE).
193. See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 17 (manuscript at 11-14)
(identifying role of discovery of ozone "hole" in producing Montreal Protocol).
194. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1994) (1962). For an
overview of the influence of the book, see Thomas Hawkins, Re-Reading Silent Spring, 102
Envtl. Health Persp. 536 (1994).
195. See Al Gore, Introduction to Carson, supra note 194, at xv, xx ("The
Environmental Protection Agency was established in 1970 in large part because of the
concerns and the consciousness that Rachel Carson had raised.").
196. See Loewenstein & Mather, supra note 16, at 171-73.
197. Id. at 172.
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ple were asking themselves what could possibly be going on." 98 With
terrorism, it is difficult to know whether the response to the 9/11 attacks
has been excessive, insufficient, or optimal.' 99 But there is no doubt that
it was a function of a highly salient event.
Some people operate as worst-case entrepreneurs, showing an intuitive
understanding of the operation of the availability heuristic. By its very
nature, the voice of an influential politician comes with amplifiers. When
public officials bring an incident before the public, a seemingly illustrative example is likely to spread far and wide. Because of the magnitude of
the harm, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 would inevitably
loom large no matter what President Bush chose to emphasize. But the
President, and his White House generally, referred to the attacks on
countless occasions, frequently as a way of emphasizing the reality of
seemingly distant threats and the need to incur significant costs to
counteract them (including the 2003 Iraq War). Indeed, President Bush
invoked salience on behalf of the Iraq War, offering a vivid picture of the
risks of inaction in his 2003 State of the Union Address: "Imagine those
19 hijackers [involved in the 9/11 attacks] with other weapons and other
plans-this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take just one vial,
one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror
20 0
like none we have ever known."
President Bush had a large incentive to invoke the 9/11 attacks. At
least in the years immediately following those attacks, a reminder of their
occurrence led Americans to show stronger support for him-and the
increase in support occurred among those inclined against him as well as
those inclined in his favor.20 1 Indeed, even a general reminder of personal mortality, not specifically mentioning the 9/11 attacks, led diverse
20 2
people to show stronger support for President Bush.
With climate change, by contrast, no salient incident triggers public
concern. Few people have, or believe that they have, personal experience
with climate change. There is no sense of personal alarm. Notwithstanding efforts to link Hurricane Katrina with climate change, 20 3 the evidence
is contested and disputable, and most Americans did not conclude that
198. Michael D. Lemonick, Death by Alligator, Time, May 29, 2006, at 47, 48.
199. For an argument that it is excessive, see Mueller, supra note 6, at 29-32 (arguing
that reaction to 9/11 has cost more lives than 9/11 itself).
200. State of the Union Message, H.R. Doc. No. 108-1, at 9 (2003).
201. Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and SocialJustice, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1119, 1140 (2006).
202. MarkJ. Landau et al., Deliver Us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and
Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush, 30 Personality Soc. Psychol.
Bull. 1136, 1140 (2004).
203. See, e.g., Ross Gelbspan, Katrina's Real Name, Boston Globe, Aug. 30, 2005, at
A17; Joseph B. Verrengia, Katrina Reignites Global Warming Debate, USATODAY.com,
Sept. 1, 2005, at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2005-09-01-katrina-globalwarming__x.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review). On the connection between
hurricanes and climate change, see Houghton, supra note 10, at 2-4, 101-02.
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the hurricane was in any sense "caused" by climate change. Consider this
question: "Do you think the severity of recent hurricanes is most likely
the result of global climate change, or is itjust the kind of severe weather
events that happen from time to time?" Only 39% responded that the
hurricanes were a product of climate change; 54% answered that severe
weather events just "happen."20 4 If a salient incident does occur, the likelihood of an American response would dramatically increase.
B. Probability Neglect
As a result of the availability heuristic, people can offer an inaccurate
assessment of probability. But sometimes people will attempt little assessment of probability at all, 20 5 especially when strong emotions are involved. 20 6 In such cases, large-scale variations in probabilities will matter
little-even when those variations unquestionably should matter a great
deal. 20 7 What affects thought and behavior is the outcome, not the likelihood that it will occur. 20 8 The point applies to hope as well as fear; vivid
images of good outcomes will crowd out consideration of probability
2 10
too. 209 Lotteries are successful partly for this reason.
The phenomenon of probability neglect received a clear empirical
confirmation in a striking study of people's willingness to pay to avoid
electric shocks. 211 The central purpose of the study was to test the relevance of probability in "affect rich" decisions. 2 12 One experiment attempted to see whether varying the probability of harm would matter
more, or less, in settings that trigger strong emotions than in settings that
seem relatively emotion-free. 2 13 In the "strong emotion" setting, participants were asked to imagine that they would participate in an experiment
involving some chance of a "short, painful, but not dangerous electric
shock. ' 2 14 In the relatively emotion-free setting, participants were told
that the experiment entailed some chance of a $20 penalty. 215 Participants were asked to say how much they would be willing to pay to avoid
204. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, supra note 155.
205. Oswald Huber et al., Active Information Search and Complete Information
Presentation in Naturalistic Risky Decision Tasks, 95 Acta Psychologica 15, 26-27 (1997)
(describing "defusing operators" used by decisionmakers to attempt to exert control over
negative event and thus avoid having to assess its probability).
206. Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks:
On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 Psychol. Sci. 185, 186-88 (2001) (finding that when
emotions are triggered, variations in probability matter relatively little).
207. Id. at 188.
208. Id.
209. See Charles T. Clotfelder & PhillipJ. Cook, Selling Hope 75-78 (1989).
210. See id.
211. See Rottenstreich & Hsee, supra note 206, at 188.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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participating in the relevant experiment. 2 16 Some participants were told
that there was a 1% chance of receiving the bad outcome (either the $20
loss or the electric shock); others were told that the chance was 99%; and
still others were told that the chance was 100%.217
The central result was that variations in probability affected those
facing the relatively emotion-free injury, the $20 penalty, far more than
they affected people facing the more emotionally evocative outcome of
an electric shock. 218 For the cash penalty, the difference between the
median payment for a 1% chance and the median payment for a 99%
chance was predictably large and indeed consistent with standard models
of rationality: $1 to avoid a 1% chance, and $18 to avoid a 99%
chance.21 9 For the electric shock, by contrast, the difference in
probability made little difference to median willingness to pay: $7 to
avoid a 1% chance, and $10 to avoid a 99% chance! 220 Apparently people will pay a significant amount to avoid a small probability of an affectladen hazard, and the amount that they will pay will not vary greatly with
changes in probability.
A similar conclusion emerges from a study of law student reactions to
the risks associated with cancer in drinking water. 221 When the bad outcome was described merely as "cancer," a ten-fold variation in risk (from
1/100,000 to 1/1,000,000) made a greater difference to people's willingness to pay for risk reduction than when the cancer was described in vivid
terms, as "very gruesome and intensely painful, as the cancer eats away at
the internal organs of the body."22 2 In short, the matter of probability
was neglected when strong emotions were triggered.
There is much evidence in the same vein. When people discuss a
low-probability risk, their concern rises even if the discussion consists
mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the likelihood of harm
really is small. 22 3 If people are asked how much they will pay for flight
insurance for losses resulting from "terrorist acts," they will pay more
than if they are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance from all
causes. 224 People also show "alarmist bias." When presented with com-

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle 77-79
(2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Laws of Fear].
222. Id. at 77.
223. See Ali Siddiq Alkahami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse
Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085, 1094
(1994).
224. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 Psychol. Bull. 267, 275
(2001).
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peting accounts of danger, they tend to move toward the more alarming
225
account.
Experiments were designed to test levels of anxiety in anticipation of
a painful electric shock of varying intensity, to be administered after a
"countdown period" of a stated length. In these studies, the stated intensity of the shock had a significant effect on physiological reactions. But
the probability of the shock had no effect. "Evidently, the mere thought
of receiving a shock is enough to arouse individuals, but the precise likeli' 226
hood of being shocked has little impact on level of arousal.
Probability neglect provides a great deal of help in understanding
the divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate change. With
respect to terrorism, there is an intense, often highly visual reaction to
bad outcomes-a reaction that can easily crowd out judgments about
probability. The same is hardly true of climate change. To be sure, there
is nothing intrinsic to the relevant risk thatjustifies this state of affairs. As
I have noted, some people urged that the devastation of Hurricane
Katrina had a great deal to do with climate change, and it is possible to
imagine a successful effort to suggest that catastrophic events were
caused, or increased in intensity, by virtue of climate change. If so,
probability neglect might spur increased regulatory controls on greenhouse gas emissions. At the present time, however, the American public
does not connect climate change with particular bad outcomes, and the
absence of aggressive regulation is best understood in light of that fact.
C. An Identifiable Perpetrator: The Goldstein Effect and Outrage
1. Goldstein and Nature. - In George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four,
political leaders focused public attention on Emmanuel Goldstein, a former member of the Party who became its despised enemy. 2 2 7 In Orwell's
narrative, the Party made Goldstein the outlet and the occasion for public
fear and outrage, even when the ultimate source of that fear and that
outrage were more plausibly a product of failures of the regime. Osama
bin Laden was never a friend to the United States or a member of any of
its political parties, and to say the least, he is a genuine enemy. But there
can be little doubt that the war on terror has been spurred by what we
might call "the Goldstein Effect," the ability to intensify public concern by
giving a definite face to the adversary, specifying a human source of the
228
underlying threat and a person to be blamed for it.
225. W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 Econ. J.
1657, 1668 (1997).
226. Loewenstein, supra note 224, at 276.
227. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Harcourt Brace-Jovanovich 1984) (1949).
228. See Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame (1992), for a general account of how
particular sources of risk are blamed, and in particular pages 9-14, for an emphasis on
practices of blaming that have cultural sources, and that cannot be captured by exploring
individual judgments about risk perception.
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Of course the risk of terrorism triggers intense outrage, whatever the
magnitude of the risk; and when outrage is triggered, the public is likely
to respond far more than it otherwise would. 229 If terrorism can be associated with a particular person or group, the response will be increased.
This approach has generally succeeded with Osama bin Laden. It was
also successful with the attack on Iraq in 2003, as Saddam Hussein became a casualty of the Goldstein Effect. To make these claims, it is of
course unnecessary to question the demonization of Osama bin Laden
and Saddam Hussein; those who are demonized may actually be demons.
The Goldstein Effect reflects a more general point, which is that people are especially likely to respond to an identifiable perpetrator-just as
they are especially likely to respond to an identifiable victim. Joseph
Stalin understood the point: "A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths
is a statistic." 2 30 What is true for victims has close parallels in the context
of perpetrators. If a wrongdoer has a clear identity-a face and a narrative-the public is far more likely to support an aggressive response.
With respect to risks of all kinds, political actors show an intuitive understanding of this point, mobilizing public reactions by giving a face to the
source of the problem. Terrorism is only the most vivid example.
There is no analogue in the context of climate change. Warmer temperatures are a product not of an identifiable perpetrator, but of the interaction between nature and countless decisions by countless actors in
the private and public domains. To the extent that nature is partly responsible, or perceived as partly responsible, public concern is greatly
dampened. 231 Consider the fact that "[h]uman intervention seems to be
an amplifier in judgments on food riskiness and contagion," and indeed
such intervention amplifies risk perception more generally, even though
"more lives are lost to natural than to man-made disasters in the
world." 232 If nature is put to one side, contributors to climate change
include not merely numerous companies in the United States and
around the world, but almost all of us, through our daily activities and
consumption. There are no obvious devils or demons here-no human
beings who actually intend to produce the harms associated with climate
change. 2 33 In the context of terrorism, a "we-they" narrative fits the facts;
in the context of climate change, those who are the solution might well
229. See Peter M. Sandman et al., Communications to Reduce Risk Underestimation
and Overestimation, 3 Risk Decision & Pol'y 93, 106 (1998) ("[S]ubjects in the highoutrage, low-risk situation reported much higher perceived threat ... than subjects in the
low-outrage, low-risk situation, although the actual risk was identical.").
230. Bartlett's Familiar Quotations 686 (17th ed., Little, Brown & Co. 2002).
231. See Iris Bohnet et al., Betrayal Aversion on Four Continents 2 (KSG Working
Paper No. RWP06-005, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=902370 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
232. Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspectives from the Study of
Contagion, in Risk, Media and Stigma 31, 38 (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001).
233. See Abbasi, supra note 18, at 122 ("The climate change story is rarely told with a
villain; in fact, to the extent that the public correctly perceives that climate change is
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also be, or seem to be, the problem. Each of us has our own "carbon
footprint." In these circumstances, public outrage is much harder to fuel,
and those concerned with climate change cannot easily take advantage of
the Goldstein Effect.
Those who are so concerned might try, and indeed have tried, to use
the Goldstein Effect against American leaders, most obviously President
Bush, charging him with negligence or even recklessness. 234 And in fact,
President Bush's decision to reject the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 "produced
a very strong negative reaction internationally, especially in Europe," and
"the citizens of Europe and their leaders were outraged. '235 But no one
can claim that President Bush has actually sought to bring about climate
change, and hence it is difficult to produce anything like the level of
outrage associated with Osama bin Laden. In the next decades, it might
be possible to enlist the Goldstein Effect against India and (especially)
China, which are anticipated to be increasingly large contributors to climate change. But nations lack faces.
2. Outrage as Multiplier. - More generally, a great deal of evidence
suggests the pervasive importance of outrage to people's reactions to risk.
Several studies test this question with the hypothesis that certain lowprobability risks, such as those associated with nuclear waste radiation,
produce outrage, whereas other low-probability risks, such as those associated with radon exposure, do not. The most striking finding is that even
when the risk was statistically identical in the nuclear waste (high outrage)
and radon (low outrage) cases, people in the nuclear waste case reported
a much greater perceived threat and a much higher intention to act to
reduce that threat. 23 6 Indeed, "the effect of outrage was practically as
large as the effect of [a] 4000-fold difference in risk between the high-risk
and low-risk conditions." 23 7 Efforts to communicate the meaning of differences in risk levels, by showing comparisons to normal risk levels, reduced the effect of outrage-but even after those efforts, outrage had
nearly the same effect as a 2,000-fold increase in risk.2 38 Outrage almost
certainly contributed to "right-to-know" legislation involving chemical releases. 23 9 Terrorism is a high-outrage threat, indeed it may be the highconnected to energy use, they may recognize their broad complicity, which limits the
conflict narrative further.").
234. See, e.g., Tim Flannery, The Weather Makers 241-42 (2005) (generally objecting
to failure of Bush Administration to seek controls on greenhouse gases); Editorial, The
State of Energy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2006, at A24 (characterizing President Bush's handling
of global warming as "a negligence from which the globe may never recover" and stating
that "[w] hile he seems finally to have signed on to the idea that the earth is warming, and
that humans are heavily responsible, he has rejected serious proposals to do anything
about it and allowed his advisers on the issue to engage in a calculated program of
disinformation").
235. See Brechin, supra note 53, at 123.
236. Sandman et al., supra note 229, at 106.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Hamilton, supra note 31, at 178-84.
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est-outrage threat, and hence the public response is likely to be far more
intense than the corresponding response to climate change.
Of course outrage is a social and cultural product, and not a brute
fact. It would be possible for officials to heighten or to reduce outrage in
either domain. In particular, those concerned about the risks associated
with climate change might well be able to increase outrage by identifying
the leading contributors to climate change and suggesting that with certain (feasible) steps, they might reduce the relevant risks.
3. Myopia and Optimism. - Many people believe that climate change
has already imposed significant losses, including a number of deaths
across the globe, perhaps as many as 150,000 each year; 240 but the most
serious risks are long term. Americans appear to understand this point.
As we have seen, they believe that the risks will be felt by future generations rather than those now living. It is also clear that this point affects
people's willingness to support expensive precautions. The difficulty is
that people sometimes "discount" the future at a very high rate, demonstrating a form of myopia that reflects bounded rationality. 24 1 At the
level of individual behavior, the result can be self-control problems that
greatly undermine people's wellbeing.24 2 Analogous problems emerge in
the political domain, as when political officials show a willingness to burden the future by relieving the present.
It is reasonable to think that a similar form of undervaluation affects
people's beliefs and behavior with respect to climate change. The problem is likely to be compounded by the presence of optimistic bias, by
which people tend to show an unrealistic belief in their own immunity
from certain risks. 24 3 At least when a risk will not be faced until the distant future, and when no available incident heightens concern, optimistic
bias can result in little concern about long term risks.
4. A Note on Culture. - I have attempted to explain the divergent
American reactions to terrorism and climate change by reference to identifiable features of individual cognition. But it might be thought that this
explanation misses something important-and that what it misses is a crucial part of diverse reactions to climate change and terrorism. Different
groups, with different cultural orientations, focus on different sources of
240. The World Health Organization estimates that climate change produces 150,000
annual deaths and five million disability-adjusted life years. See Jonathan A. Patz et al.,
Impact of Regional Climate Change on Human Health, 438 Nature 310, 313 (2005);Juliet
Eilperin, Climate Shift Tied to 150,000 Fatalities, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 2005, at A20.
241. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical
Review, 40 J. Econ. Literature 351, 393-94 (2002); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443, 443-44 (1997); W. Kip Viscusi, Rational
Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at
22, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
242. See the discussion of bounded willpower in Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1479 (1998).
243. See Bazerman & Watkins, supra note 83, at 74-77; Shelley E. Taylor, Positive
Illusions 32-36 (1989) (exploring unrealistic optimism in general terms).
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danger and on widely diverse risks. Consider a mundane example:
"Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is
deadly; they also believe that putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The
English, however, rather enjoy a cool drink of water after some cherries,
and Americans love icy refreshments." 244 Other forms of cultural variability are more dramatic. In some cultures, judgments about what causes
2 45
risks, and what reduces risks, would seem extremely puzzling in others.
In a number of papers, Dan Kahan and his coauthors have explored
this question. In particular, they have drawn attention to what they call
"cultural cognition"-to risk-related judgments that are a product of cultural orientations, which serve as a kind of heuristic for more fine-grained
judgments. 24 6 On this approach, 247 people can be sorted into four
groups: individualists, hierarchists, egalitarians, and solidarists. Those
who fall into the individualist camp tend to distrust government regulation and to believe in free markets; hence they are unlikely to be greatly
concerned about climate change. The same is true of hierarchists, who
favor the established social order, and who reject efforts to disrupt it;
controls on climate change might well be seen as disruptive. By contrast,
egalitarians are skeptical of businesses and other institutions that are
thought to produce large-scale inequalities in society; egalitarians are
sympathetic to environmental causes in general, and they are greatly concerned about climate change. The same is true of solidarists, who believe
that human beings owe strong duties to one another-duties that environmental degradation violates.
Kahan and his coauthors claim to show that cultural cognition helps
to explain public reactions to numerous risks, including those associated
with climate change. 248 Egalitarians and solidarists are significantly more
concerned about climate change than are hierarchists and individualists.
Indeed, Kahan and his coauthors contend that cultural dispositions are a
more accurate predictor of such judgments than party identification and
demographic characteristics such as race, religion, gender, and wealth. 249
In the context of climate change, they find, on the basis of survey evidence, that this is in fact true. 250 Certainly it can be demonstrated that
political commitments are "clustered"; those who believe that society has
244. See Joseph Henrich et al., Group Report: What Is the Role of Culture in
Bounded Rationality?, in Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 343, 353-54 (Gerd
Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2001), for an entertaining outline in connection with
food choice decisions.
245. See Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger 1-6 (Routledge 1994) (1966).
246. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 149 (2006); Kahan et al., supra note 111, at 1085-87 (reviewing
Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 221).
247. The foundations of the approach can be found in Mary Douglas & Aaron
Wildavsky, Risk and Culture 2-15 (1982).
248. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 246, at 149-57.
249. See id. at 171.
250. See id. at 158-59.
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"become too soft and feminine," or that government "interferes too
much in our daily lives," are more likely to resist strong measures to combat climate change. To this extent, there is a link between cultural dispositions and views about climate change. In addition, cultural differences
might well be associated with different judgments about particular riskreduction measures connected with terrorism; before its broader unpopularity, the war in Iraq, for example, split people along lines that are cultural in the sense used by Kahan and his coauthors.
It is possible to go further. It is likely that some groups do consider
climate change to be a more serious threat than terrorism, and those
groups appear to be identifiable along cultural lines. My own small-scale
survey at the University of Chicago Law School found that most respondents did consider climate change the more serious problem, by a margin of 73% to 27%.251 An identical study of students at Yale Law School
showed similar results, with climate change ranked ahead of terrorism by
a margin of 75% to 25%.252 As noted, most Americans do not agree.
The University of Chicago and Yale studies did not test for cultural dispositions, but we can say, with some degree of confidence, that as compared
with individualists and hierarchists, egalitarians and solidarists are likely
to rank the risks of climate change as equivalent to, or higher than, those
associated with terrorism.
But there is a problem with use of the idea of cultural cognition to
explain American reactions to climate change and terrorism. Why, exactly, are individualists less concerned about climate change than are
egalitarians? What connects "culture" to risk perceptions? To make progress, it is necessary to specify the mechanisms by which culture contrib253
utes to judgments about risks. A key point involves social influences.
If people do not know whether climate change causes serious risks, they
are likely to form a judgment on the basis of what they learn from those
they know and trust.254 Those who believe that climate change is a seri251. In this survey, conducted in April 2006, I asked about twenty-five law students at
the University of Chicago to rank four problems in terms of seriousness: climate change,
terrorism, motor vehicle safety, and occupational safety and health. My interest was in the
relative ranking of climate change and terrorism, and the percentages in the text reflect
that interest.
252. This study, identical to the University of Chicago Law School study, see supra
note 251, involved twenty-seven students.
253. On social influences in general, see Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many
Minds Produce Knowledge 81-102 (2006) (discussing hidden profiles, cascades, and
group polarization). For a particularly vivid study, with many implications for the
development and operation of culture, see MatthewJ. Salganik et al., Experimental Study
of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 Science 854 (2006)
(describing experiment in which some songs became very popular and other songs failed
to do so, only because of perception that songs had been downloaded a lot or a little). In
my view, the development of social fears has a great deal to do with the mechanisms
explored by Salganik et al.
254. On the relevance of this point to environmental policy, see William Brock,
Tipping Points, Abrupt Opinion Changes, and Punctuated Policy Change, in Punctuated
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ous problem might so believe because they are following the views of
trusted others.25 5 If people sort themselves into different groups, showing different fears, then risk perceptions will be influenced by the different memberships of the different groups, and such perceptions will diverge accordingly. 256 Note that the resulting differences may or may not
operate along geographical lines. If environmentalists are influenced by
other environmentalists, then their fears about climate change might
have little to do with physical location.
This understanding of cultural cognition emphasizes the role of social influences on individual beliefs and actions. Such influences come in
two forms: informational and reputational. 25 7 Suppose that trusted people believe that climate change is a serious problem; if so, there is reason
to believe that climate change imposes significant risks, because that belief supplies valuable information. And if trusted or at least powerful people so believe, there is reason to go along with them, in large part because
they may well be right, but also to avoid incurring their wrath; there is a
reputational reason to follow them. When people are divided along certain lines, and when certain beliefs tend to "cluster," it is typically because
of informational and reputational pressures. To the extent that beliefs
about climate change are a product of cultural cognition, social influences are a large part of the explanation. Indeed, bounded rationality
and social influences operate together, as social interactions increase
availability, produce or attenuate probability neglect, aggravate outrage,
and spur myopia and optimistic bias. The behavioral factors emphasized
here hardly operate in a social vacuum.
We might also want to explore attitudes toward terrorism and climate change as they operate across different nations. Perhaps something
in American culture helps to account for the divergent reactions that I
am investigating. But even if this is so, culture should not be treated as a
black box. The domestic judgment will inevitably be affected by a perception of domestic consequences and in particular of domestic costs and
benefits. 25 8 The United States took a strong stand against ozone-depleting chemicals, and hence was probably the most aggressive nation in the
world in attempting to combat a global environmental problem often
Equilibrium, supra note 87, at 48 (discussing social learning and its effects on rapid
changes in environmental policy).
255. This describes what is known as cascade effects. See generally David Hirshleifer,
The Blind Leading the Blind, in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188 (Mariano
Tommasi & Kathryn lerulli eds., 1995) (exploring dynamics of informational cascades).
On the implications for risk regulation, see Brock, supra note 254, at 50 (exploring
cascade effects and their effects on rapid changes in environmental policy).
256. See Salganik et al., supra note 253, at 854 (showing divergences as result of such
sorting in domain of cultural products).
257. See Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 221, at 94-102 (investigating
informational and reputational cascades in domain of risk regulation).
258. Benedick, Morals and Myths, supra note 151, at 15-16 (exploring how national
self-interest helps account for targets in Kyoto Protocol).
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coupled with climate change. 259 And while many nations have ratified
the Kyoto Protocol, and appear by their statements to be far more concerned about climate change than the United States, actual practice
shows a more complex story-with several such nations showing emissions increases, in the last period, equivalent to or greater than those of
2 60
the United States.
In any case, cross-national variations are affected, in large part, by
behavioral factors of the sort that I have emphasized. More specifically,
salient events can greatly increase fear in one nation but not others, and
divergences in salience help to explain cross-national variations. In particular, the availability heuristic helps to explain such variations, though
what is available is affected by, and is a contributor to, cultural
261
differences.
D. Boundedly Rational Risk Perception
The behavioral account is now in place. Those who emphasize the
availability heuristic, probability neglect, outrage, myopia, and optimism
do not contend that risk perception and risk-related behavior are "irrational"; instead they stress the role of mental shortcuts and emotions in
heightening or dampening people's judgments about risk. Those who
suffer from bounded rationality do care about both costs and benefits,
but their assessment of these is affected by heuristics and biases, in a way
that can lead to severe and systematic errors. If the argument thus far is
correct, bounded rationality provides the best and most complete account of the divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate
change.
1. A Problem. - An obvious objection might be raised against this
argument: It is exceedingly difficult to contend that anyone is making
"errors" here. We might be tempted to think that because of availability
bias, the risk of terrorist attacks is inflated; 262 we might similarly think
that because of unavailability bias, the risks associated with climate
change are underestimated. But there is no universally accepted benchmark from which to make these judgments. With respect to terrorism,
the questions of probability are too uncertain to justify a confident conclusion that Americans are excessively fearful; 263 a "best estimate" of 300
terrorism-related deaths in, say, the next year may turn out to be too high
or too low, but no clear evidence justifies a confident judgment, in the
present year, that this estimate is optimistic or pessimistic. In retrospect,
259. See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 17 (manuscript at 13-15)
(detailing aggressive role of United States in pushing for Montreal Protocol).
260. See id. at 33.
261. For discussion, see Kahan et al., supra note 111, at 1085 (arguing that different
cultural groups have different "availability" to incidents).
262. See Mueller, supra note 6, at 13-28 (arguing that risk of catastrophic terrorist
attack remains extremely small).
263. But see id. at 13-28 (arguing that fears are excessive).
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some of the terrorism-related probability judgments of Americans in 2003
did seem inflated, 264 but this is not an area in which availability is clearly
leading to excessive fear. With climate change, it is also difficult to say
that all or most Americans are underestimating the current risks. Perhaps the nation is doing too little to respond to those risks, but existing
evidence does not justify a confident conclusion that the existing percep26 5
tion of risk is too low.
What can be said, then, is not that there are any clear errors, but that
the behavioral factors-availability, probability neglect, and outrage, in
particular-help to explain the divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate change, and a purely rational account is, to that extent,
incomplete. Of course it is possible to insist that the United States has
operated sensibly on the basis of available information; that the events of
9/11 supplied valuable information; and that the risks of climate change
are, on the basis of available information, insufficient to justify highly aggressive controls. But this account is too insensitive to what is generally
known about risk perception, and it disregards the fact that the behavioral factors would predict exactly the divergence that we observe. As I
have emphasized, boundedly rational people are attentive to the costs
and benefits of risk regulation. The problem is that their assessments of
the relevant factors are often distorted by behavioral influences.
2. Prescription.- It is for this reason that in the United States, national leaders are under little pressure to attempt to reduce the risks associated with climate change.2 66 Of course such leaders have considerable
room to maneuver. So long as Americans are not greatly affected in economic or other terms, real steps to reduce greenhouse gases would be
publicly acceptable. But if leaders believe that the argument for such
steps is weak, we would not expect them to be forthcoming. Let us suppose that the American government should, in principle, be doing much
more to control greenhouse gas emissions.2 67 How might it be encouraged to do so?
264. See Feigenson et al., supra note 122, at 996 (showing personal belief on part of
American respondents that they faced 8.27% chance of dying due to terrorism in next
year).
265. For evidence of sensible risk perceptions, see W. Kip Viscusi & Richard
Zeckhauser, The Perception and Valuation of the Risks of Climate Change: A Rational
and Behavioral Blend 9 (KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-062, 2005), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=832645 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing that
among highly educated Americans, risk perceptions with respect to climate change show
high degree of accuracy, in terms of their consistency with expert projections).
266. The California experience is a counterexample, and it is possible that the United
States will eventually take steps along the lines of those in California. For discussion, see
Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 17 (manuscript at 6-7).
267. Many people do, in fact, take this position. See, e.g., Abbasi, supra note 18, at
141-53 (listing five recommendations for politicians); Posner, supra note 5, at 155-65
(arguing for taxes on greenhouse gases); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener,
Reconstructing Climate Policy 68-75 (2003) (arguing for international agreement that
includes much emissions trading and participation by developing nations); Sheila M.
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a. Costs. - The easiest way would be to attempt to replicate the success of efforts to combat depletion of the ozone layer-by showing that
the costs of reduction efforts would be far lower than feared. The magnitude of those costs is of course an empirical question. But the replacement of ozone-depleting chemicals turned out to be far less expensive
than originally anticipated, and the unexpectedly low costs helped to
spur American enthusiasm for international restrictions. 268 In sharp contrast to climate change, the American public was willing to support steps
to protect the ozone layer, while the European public was indifferent or
even opposed to such steps, in part because of a perception that their
2 69
costs would be significant.
On the cost side, a great deal depends on technological innovations.
Technology-forcing has proved successful in many domains. If the anticipated costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions remain very high, aggressive action is less likely. But if it is possible to reduce such emissions
without imposing significant economic burdens, perhaps by forcing technological innovation with respect to greenhouse gases, 270 the American
posture would surely shift, perhaps dramatically.
b. Benefits. - A second way to affect American attitudes would operate on the benefit side. If the United States actually had, or believed that
it had, a great deal to lose from climate change, and in the immediate
future rather than the long run, more costly regulation would be anticipated. 27 ' Here we might replicate the experience not only of the
Montreal Protocol but also of the acid deposition program of the Clean
Air Act, which was spurred in part by new evidence of the risks associated
with acid deposition. 272 No salient incident lay behind the acid deposition program. A clearer appreciation of the risks of climate change
would undoubtedly affect American attitudes. 273 New projections of
harm, suggesting that the United States has a great deal to lose, would
undoubtedly have an impact. 2 7 4 But for purposes of understanding pubOlmstead & Robert N. Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era,
96 Am. Econ. Rev. 35, 35-36 (2006) (calling for broad coverage of treaty and economic
incentives); Robert N. Stavins, Can an Effective Global Climate Treaty Be Based on Sound
Science, Rational Economics, and Pragmatic Politics? 10-11 (2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing for treaty that is based on
appreciation of costs and benefits). A valuable discussion can be found in Scott Barrett,
Kyoto and Beyond: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 22
(2006).
268. See the account in Percival et al., supra note 42, at 1049-51.
269. Id. at 1050.
270. On some of the possibilities, see Stern, supra note 7, at 221-26.
271. See Lane, supra note 87, at 183-84.
272. See Ellerman et al., supra note 140, at 22-30 (showing role of economic thinking
in producing acid deposition regulation).
273. This is the basic message of Abbasi, supra note 18, at 24-32.
274. See Stern, supra note 7, at 128, 130 (offering qualitative account of risks and also
quantitative account of both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios); Frank Ackerman & Ian
Finlayson, The Economics of Inaction on Climate Change: A Sensitivity Analysis 16-18
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lic perceptions, it is important to underline the potential role of vivid
images of harm. Such images, introduced by a salient incident or by concrete narratives, can have large effects on legislative initiatives; 275 and if
there is anything like a kind of 9/11 for climate change, aggressive measures might well be anticipated.
I have emphasized the role of leaders in the private and public sectors; public beliefs and desires are endogenous to their claims, and hence
the salience of 9/11, and the continuing sense of fear, had a great deal to
do with the statements and actions of President Bush. 276 In 2004, the
White House released a fact sheet on the war on terror, starting with a
quotation from President Bush: "[W]e're still not safe .... We are a Nation in danger." 277 By contrast, Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that
there is "no bigger long-term question facing the global community" than
the threat of climate change. 278 Because of the fact of 9/11, and because
serious efforts to control climate change would inevitably impose real
costs on the United States, any American official will have limited ability
to shift the public's current levels of concern. But there is no question
that fear of terrorist attacks can be heightened or diminished 27 9-and
that it would be possible to increase the salience and hence the level of
concern about the risks associated with climate change, and hence to
magnify the public demand for a regulatory response.
c. Costs and Benefits: A Final Comparison. - I have offered a number
of comparisons between the problem of ozone depletion and that of climate change, and it may be useful to conclude by offering a more systematic overview. In 1988, the Environmental Protection Agency offered the
following account of the costs and benefits of the Montreal Protocol:

(Global Dev. and Envtl. Inst., Working Paper No. 06-07, Oct. 2006), available at http://
www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/06-07Economicslnaction.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (suggesting that costs of inaction are higher than previous estimates indicate).
275. See Hamilton, supra note 31, at 178-84 (emphasizing role of Bhopal disaster in
spurring Toxic Release Inventory); Kahn, supra note 81, at 23-24 (finding increased
congressional response after environmental disasters).
276. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 164-70.
277. Id. at 166 (quoting Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Three Years of
Progress in the War on Terror: Fact Sheet (Sept. 11, 2004), at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2004/09/2004091 1.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
278. Norton & Leaman, supra note 54, at 2 (quoting Climate Issue 'Critical' to Blair,
BBC News, Apr. 27, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/3662303.stm (on file with
the Columbia Law Review)).
279. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 160-72.
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COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MONTREAL PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED
STATES (IN BILLIONS OF
No controls

1985

DOLLARS)

Montreal Protocol

28 0

Unilateral

implementation of
Montreal Protocol by
the United States
Benefits

3,575

1,373

Costs

21

21

3,554

1,352

Net benefits

-

It should be clear that for the United States, unilateral action was
amplyjustified, because the health benefits of American action would create substantial benefits to the American public. And if the world joined
the Montreal Protocol, the benefits would be nearly tripled, because it
would prevent 245 million cancers, including more than five million cancer deaths. 28 1 One of the most noteworthy features of the ozone depletion problem is that over time, the United States was anticipated to be a
decreasingly large contributor to that problem. By 2050, no controls
were expected to mean a 15.7% decrease in the ozone layer, whereas
unilateral American action would produce a 10.3% decrease, and the international agreement would result in a mere 1.9% decrease. 2 82 By 2100,
no controls were expected to mean a 50% decrease; unilateral action a
49% decrease; and the international agreement a 1.2% decrease. 283 In
the short run, aggressive action by the United States alone was amplyjustified by the cost-benefit calculus. In the long run, the United States
would do much better with global cooperation. At the same time, the
expected cost of the Montreal Protocol, a mere $21 billion, greatly dampto be even lower than
ened public resistance, and the cost turned out284
anticipated because of technological innovation.
Compare in this regard an influential account of the relevant figures
for the Kyoto Protocol:

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See Barrett, supra note 28, at 228 tbl.8.1.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 228 tbl.8.1.
Id.
Id. at 231.
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COSTS AND BENEFITS OF KYOTO PROTOCOL IN THE UNITED
STATES (IN BILLIONS OF

Benefits

DOLLARS)

285

No controls

Kyoto Protocol

Unilateral Action to
Comply with Kyoto
Protocol

-

12

Approximately 0286

325

325

-313

-325

Costs
Net benefits

1990

-

What is noteworthy here is that on this admittedly controversial projection, the costs of the Kyoto Protocol were much higher than the costs
of the Montreal Protocol (by some $313 billion), and the benefits of the
former were much lower than the benefits of the latter (by some $3,562
billion!). For the Kyoto Protocol, the cost-benefit ratio seems, on this
account, to be so unpromising that from the standpoint of American selfinterest, a great deal would have to be done to justify American support,
at least from that standpoint. Note that the cost-benefit ratio, for the
Kyoto Protocol, ought not to be taken to suggest that the monetized costs
of climate change are trivial. On the contrary, they are estimated in the
trillions of dollars-$4 trillion in present value, according to one estimate. 287 The problem is that the Kyoto Protocol, by itself, would do relatively little to reduce those costs; on one projection, the controls in the
protocol would reduce total warming by merely 0.03' C by 2100.288
Nor do I mean to endorse any particular set of numbers, or to deny
the possibility that the Kyoto Protocol, or a similar agreement, might be
defended either on the ground that it could serve as the foundation for a
better one, or as a means of producing technological innovation. The
point is not to deny that climate change might impose serious burdens,
risks, and costs for the United States as for other nations; it is only that for
the United States to find regulatory controls worthwhile, a method must
be found to drive down the costs (actual and perceived) and to increase
the benefits (actual and perceived).
285. See Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 156-67.
286. This is my estimate. It is a product of the fact that the Kyoto Protocol, by itself, is
anticipated to make a modest contribution to the reduction of warming-according to
Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 152, a reduction of 0.030 C. If the United States acted
only on its own, it would inevitably produce a small fraction of that benefit, and the
consequent benefits for the United States are likely, as a first approximation, to be zero. I
am assuming that unilateral action does not spur action by other nations.
287. See Barrett, supra note 28, at 379. A much more systematic effort, with a far
higher figure, can be found in Stern, supra note 7, at vi-xi (suggesting in particular
anticipated 5-20% loss in global GDP from 2-5' C warming, with 10% loss in poor
nations). For a criticism, see Stern, supra note 7, at 6-17 (suggesting that figures in Stern
Review are inflated because of use of unjustifiably low discount rate).
288. Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 152. According to current trends, warming
of 2-3' C is anticipated within the next fifty years, see Stem, supra note 7, at vi, and in the
°
longer term, there is a greater than 50% chance of warming in excess of 5 C, see id. at iv.
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A broader agreement, including China and India in particular,
would significantly increase the benefits of greenhouse gas reduction,
simply because it would include increasingly important contributors to
the problem, as developing countries are projected to account for over
half of total global emissions by 2020 and possibly before. 2 89 Hence a
broader agreement would greatly magnify the benefits to both the United
States and the world. 290 It should also be possible to design an agreement that dramatically reduces the costs for America and elsewhere-as,
for example, with global emissions trading and with emissions reduction
2 91
requirements that grow over time as technology advances.
The point is not, however, to suggest an ideal treaty to handle the
problem of climate change. 292 It is only to suggest that American perceptions and behavior are likely to change only if the assessment of costs and
benefits changes as well. A purely technocratic analysis and good policy
design, of the sort that culminated in the Montreal Protocol, may be sufficient to accomplish that task. But it is reasonable to suspect that in light
of the complexity of the climate change problem, and the inevitably high
cost of addressing it, vivid incidents, real or imagined, will have to play a
role.
CONCLUSION

My principal goal here has been to make some progress in understanding the divergent American reactions to the risks associated with terrorism and climate change, and in that way to help explain the existing
patterns of law and regulation. American reactions are greatly affected by
the availability heuristic, probability neglect, and outrage. Those reactions have been dampened for climate change, because Americans have
believed that they have relatively little to lose from greenhouse gas emissions and that expensive regulation would mostly help people in other
nations in the distant future. Partly for that reason, they have been unwilling to spend a great deal to respond to the problem. The images
associated with terrorism are concrete and easy to envision; the images
associated with climate change are highly abstract.
Of course interest group pressures and the statements of public officials matter, and such pressures and statements can help both to shape
public perceptions and to affect the likelihood of any regulatory response. I have emphasized the role of leaders in the private and public
289. See Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 267, at 35-36.
290. See Barrett, supra note 28, at 379; Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 5, at 123-44.
291. William Nordhaus, The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change 2-3
(Nov. 17, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available
at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/SternReviewD2.pdf (suggesting that economic analysis
supports "modest rates of emissions reductions in the near term, followed by sharp
reductions in the medium and long term").
292. Stern, supra note 7, at vi-ix (describing importance of treaty regulation in this
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sectors. Public beliefs and desires are influenced by their claims, and
hence the salience of 9/11, and the continuing sense of fear, had a great
deal to do with the statements and actions of President Bush. 29 3 Recall
President Bush's words in 2004: "We are a Nation in danger." 294 Recall
too that Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that there is "no bigger longterm question facing the global community" than the threat of climate
change. 295 Statements of this kind undoubtedly have contributed to the
greater public concern with climate change in the United Kingdom than
in the United States.
Because of the attacks of 9/11, and because serious efforts to control
climate change would almost certainly impose real costs on the United
States, any American official will not have unlimited ability to shift the
public's levels of concern. But there is no question that fear of terrorist
attacks can be heightened or diminished-and that it would be possible
to increase the salience and hence the level of concern about the risks
associated with climate change, and in that way to magnify the public
demand for a regulatory response.
If the public's analysis of likely costs and benefits shifted, perhaps as
a result of more vivid incidents of tangible harm, 296 domestic controls on
greenhouse gases, and American participation in international agreements, would be far more probable. For the risks associated with climate
change, it is not simple to promote availability; but vivid images are possible to provide here as well. There are multiple equilibria: Single incidents and small shocks can make an extraordinary difference in terms of
law and regulation.2 97 With respect to terrorism, the attack of 9/11 was
not exactly a small shock, but a single incident, on a single day, radically
altered the associated risk perceptions of Americans, and greatly affected
law as well.
293. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 164-70.
294. Id. at 166 (quoting Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Three Years of
Progress in the War on Terror: Fact Sheet (Sept. 11, 2004), at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040911.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review)).
295. Norton & Leaman, supra note 54, at 2 (quoting Climate Change Critical to Blair,
BBC News, Apr. 27, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3662303.stm (on file with
the Columbia Law Review)).
296. Michael Crichton's controversial bestseller, State of Fear (2004), shows a strong
understanding of cognitive and behavioral factors. (To avoid giving away the punchline, I
offer no details.) The same is true of Al Gore's popular film, An Inconvenient Truth
(Paramount Classics & Participant Prod. 2006). (The punchline there is clear.)
297. See Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and
Focusing Events 131-44 (1997) (exploring role of disasters in focusing public and
legislative attention); Thomas A. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change After
Catastrophic Events 57-58 (2006) (emphasizing that disasters can greatly affect legislative
agenda); Hamilton, supra note 31, at 178-84 (showing role of Bhopal disaster in
producing American legislation); Brock, supra note 254, at 48-49, 76; Kahn, supra note 81,
at 23-24 (finding increased legislative activity after environmental disasters); Repetto,
supra note 87, at 9.
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To be sure, what is available to some may not be available to all, in
part because of social influences, and in part because of individual, cultural, and national predispositions. It follows that some nations will find
the bad outcomes associated with one or another risk to be "available"
not only because of highly publicized events, but also because the relevant citizens are predisposed to focus on some risks rather than others.
But even across national differences, public assessments can be altered by
available incidents; if vivid incidents become salient, aggressive regulation
is far more likely to be forthcoming.

